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This thesis examines the Small Business Administration
(SBA) program to use the authority granted by section 6(a) of
the 1956 Amendment to the Small Business Act to aid socially
or economically disadvantaged persons, and its impact on the
Navy shore facilities construction and maintenance procurement
system. The origin of the SBA's 6(a) authority and the con-
sistency of its present use with the intent of Congress in
granting that authority is examined including court challenges
to that use. The current operational procedures followed by
the SBA and the Navy in obtaining and providing support for
the program are described and evaluated. A proposed method
for evaluation of the Navy's support to the 6(a) program, and
in particular the support provided by its shore facilities
construction and maintenance manager, the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, is introduced Also, recommendations for
improvement in present operational procedures are presented







A. AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTENT OF THE
SBA PROGRAM TO AID MINORITY CONTRACTORS 19
1. World War II— 20
2. The Korean War 22
3. Creation of the SBA 23
4. Civil Rights Pressure 25
5. Use of Section 8(a) of the
Small Business Act 26
B. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF 8(a) 28
III. PROGRAM DYNAMICS AND PROBLEMS
IN APPLICATION — 33
A. ORGANIZATIONAL REGULATIONS
AND VIEWPOINTS — — 33
1. Regulations — 33
2. Viewpoints —- 34
Bo THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
8(a) PROGRAM-——- — 38
1. The SBA's Goals — 38
2 The Navy's Goals——- 39
3e The Need for New Goals 40
Co ELIGIBILITY FOR ENTRY INTO THE PROGRAM 44
1. Socially or Economically Disadvantaged ^5
2. Ownership and Control 48
3o The Effect of Resource Limitations 50
a. Sponsorship 50
bo Impact on Contractors 56

D. THE BUSINESS PLAN 59
1. SBA Policy 59
2 C Business Plan Content 60
3. Risks of Preparation 65
E. SELECTION OF CANDIDATE 8(a) CONTRACTS 66
1« Procedures: Theoretical vs. Actual 66
2. NAVFAC Responsibility vs. Authority 68
3o Factors Affecting Selection 70
4. SBA Goals as a Factor 75
5. Local Task Force Concept— — 77
F. CONTRACTOR SELECTION AND NEGOTIATION Si
1. Selection of a Contractor 8l
2. Negotiation and BDE £2
3» Negotiator Conflict of Interest-- 87
G. ADMINISTRATION—— 91
1, The Contracts —• 92
2, Routine Administration ——— — 93
3, SBA Responsibility— —— 94
H. CONTRACTOR GRADUATION OR TERMINATION——- 95
IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING EVALUATION OF AGENCY SUPPORT— 98
A. SIZE DIFFERENCES — 99
B. GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION — 102
Co ANNUAL VARIATIONS 108
D. NONUNIFORMITY OF SBA SUPPORT — 109
E. A METHOD FOR EVALUATION OF AGENCY SUPPORT 110
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 113
APPENDIX A: Section 8(a) of the 1958 Amendment to the






Key Personnel Contacted 125
The Small Business Administration 127
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command- 129
Comparison of EFD and Activity Set
Aside s
APPENDIX F: DOD and NAVFAC Small Business Set
Asides and 8(a) Awards







INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 140

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to express appreciation to their thesis
advisor, Professor Robert Judson, for his invaluable assistance
and guidance in the preparation of this thesis. His extensive
knowledge and understanding of the federal procurement system
and his background in this area made the authors' frequent
consultations of exceptional benefit. The authors are also
indebted to LCDR Edward Zabrycki for the stimulation and
guidance he provided in getting the thesis underway
Sincere appreication is extended to all the key personnel
contacted, and in addition the authors are thankful for the
understanding and patience of their wives whose help and




Section 8(a) of the 195$ Amendment to the Small Business
Act grants the Small Business Administration (SBA) the
authority to enter into contracts with other government
departments and agencies, and to arrange for the performance
of these contracts by negotiating or otherwise letting sub-
contracts to small business concerns or others for the required
goods or services. To date, the SBA s policy regarding its
3(a) authority has been to use the authority to aid in the
establishment and growth of firms owned and controlled by
socially or economically disadvantaged persons
o
This thesis examines this use of 8(a) authority by the
SBA, in an effort, to evaluate the effectiveness of the program
and the efficiency of its administration by the SBA, Problems,
inherent in the nature of such a program and those encountered
during implementation, are examined and recommendations for
improvements presented, A specific case, the efficiency of
the 8(a) program administration and procedures as they relate
to the Navy's shore facilities construction and maintenance
program is investigated. Causes for variations in the past
performance of the Navy and the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVTAC), the Navy's shore facilities construction
Appendix A provides the exact wording of this authority.

and maintenance agency, in providing support for the program
were sought and suggestions for improvement offered.
The data used in this thesis was obtained primarily-
through field trips to Washington, D. C, Norfolk, Va.,
Charleston, S. C, Philadelphia, Pa., and San Francisco,
Calif, where personal interviews were conducted with person-
nel from the General Accounting Office, and various SBA,
Navy, and other government offices. Telephone interviews
were also held with personnel from the above agencies as
well as Department of Defense (DOD) personnel. Due to
limited resources, interviews with B(a) contractors were
not conducted, although a personal interview was held with
a "Washington, D. C. lawyer who represented several $(a) firms,
was a consultant to $(a) firms, and had conducted a study on
the $(a) program. In addition, a substantial amount of data
regarding 8(a) contractors was obtained from reports by other
researchers based on surveys of these contractors. Key per-
sonnel contacted are presented in Appendix B. In addition,
reports and documents listed in the bibliography were re-
searched and a questionnaire sent to five of NAVFAC's engineer-
ing field divisions to obtain further data for the thesis.
For those readers unfamiliar with the Small Business
Administration and the Naval Facilities Engineering Commandj
a brief summary of the organization and mission of each is
provided in Appendices C and D respectively. Due to time
and financial restrictions, the authors were unable to visit
the Pacific Division of NAVFAC . As a result, in obtaining
10

data from and about NAVFAC , the five CONUS EFD's were used as
a source of data about Navy procurement offices involved in
construction and maintenance contracting.
This introduction will provide the reader with a brief
review of the circumstances and events which led to the SBA's
present policy of restricting its 3(a) program to minority
firms. Following this review will be a definition of the
writers' philosophy concerning the future of the 3(a) program,
and concluding the introduction will be a short discussion
of the contents and purpose of each of the remaining sections
of the thesis.
Although the 3(a) authority was granted the Small Business
Administration in 1953, no action was taken to use this
authority until 1967 o In promulgating its 195$ regulations,
the SBA took the position that the authority was only to be
used in periods of emergency, although no definition was
offered of what situation would constitute an emergency.
[Refo 1$, p, 200] In spite of repeated statements by the
Congress that this position was contrary to its (the Congress')
intent
,
and in the absence of any court cases which might
have resolved the issue, the SBA continued to adhere to that
position until as late as 1963o In response to Congressional
inquiries as to why the SBA was not using its 3(a) authority
See H.R. Final Report No. 2235, 36th Congress, 2nd Session
3l (i960); Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, 37th Congress, 1st Session at 262-264
(196l); Hearings on II. R. 4525 Before the Committee on Banking
and Currency, 84th Congress, 1st Session at 97 (1955),
11

to increase the contracts awarded to small business, the SBA
explained that it preferred to work with the procuring agencies
to develop direct small business contacts with them rather
than utilizing Section 8(a). [Ref. 5, p. 408] The SBA
believed that the efforts to start and operate an 8(a) program
would not be worthwhile in terms of developing small business.
[Ref. 7, p» 1] As an indication of the low priority accorded
the program by the SBA, the 1968 staffing for the program at
the SBA level, was five persons [Ref c 5, p» 411]
President Johnson found the 8(a) authority held by the
SBA to be potentially an easily accessible tool by which he
could rapidly respond to some of the pressures represented
in the civil rights movement. On October 2, 1967, he announced
the creation of the President's Test Cities Program, an
experimental program designed to combat hard-core unemployment.
[Ref. 7, p. i] Under this program, the SBA used its 8(a)
powers to ai^ard eight subcontracts totaling $10.5 million
during FY 68. Used to meet procurement requirements of the
Department of Defense, the subcontracts were awarded to
established manufacturing firms [Ref. 3, P<> i] In turn,
the firms agreed to locate in or near the ghetto areas of
five cities and train the area's unemployed to perform the
requirements of the contracts. Several months into the program,
the SBA realized that mere employment did not provide an ade-
quate solution to the problems of the hard-core unemployed,
and began to consider whether business ownership would provide
a better vehicle for low-income and minority people to enter
America's economic mainstream. [Ref, 7, p& 2]
12

The Small Business Administration moved in early 1969 to
change the objectives of the 8(a) program to one of establishing
and promoting the growth of minority small business firms. In
October of that year, Executive Order 1145$ provided support
for the change in the program objectives by instructing the
appropriate Federal departments and agencies to establish pro-
grams to strengthen minority business enterprises.
Contractual support from the Department of Defense for
the 8(a) program continued in FY 69 with DOD providing $8,5
million of the $8,9 million in contracts awarded by the SBA
in that year, [Ref, 39] As the 8(a) program continued to
expand, the SBA altered its "emergency use" policy in 1970
by deleting this restriction, [Ref, 17, p, 700] Further
evidence of the SBA's new attitude towards the potential of
8(a) was manifested by the growth in the number of SBA em-
ployees associated with the program to 69 at the start of FY
72. [Ref. 5, p. 411]
Emphasis within the Executive branch on the 8(a) program
has remained relatively constant from 1972 to the present.
As recently as December 1974, the President issued a memoran-
dum to the members of his Cabinet stressing his interest in
assistance to disadvantaged minoritj.es and seeking improvement
in the Government's minority business development program.
[Ref. 34] The number and dollar value of contracts awarded
by the SBA has grown steadily from 28 contracts totaling $8.9
million in FY 69 to 2303 contracts totaling $279.2 million
for FY 74. The progress in terms of numbers of companies,
13

contracts, and total dollar volume of awards can be seen
in Table l c
Table 1











1963 8 10,493,524 7
1969 23 3,357,771 21
1970 199 22,520,209 144
1971 309 63,415,373 503
1972 1646 143,334,654 924
1973 1977 213,262,772 1070
1974 2303 279,239,960 1156
Source: Small Business Administration, Status Report of
8(a) contracts, Washington, Government Printing
Office, March 31, 1975.
Department of Defense support during this period grew
from $3.5 million in FY 69 to $143,1 million in FY 74. Figure
1 indicates the increase in total contract value (dollars)
over this period of time* As can be seen in Figure 1, DOD
has provided approximately 50fi of all contracts awarded the
SBA. Figure 1 will be found on the following page.
The SBA's restrictive interpretation as to the eligibility
of only minority firms for the 3(a) program has not been agreed
with universally, and several court cases have resulted. The
basic argument in these cases has been that the use of the
program to aid only minority firms is illegal because this










69 70 71 72
Fiscal Year
Small Business Administration, Status Report of 8 ( a)
Contracts
,
Washington, GPO, MarcTTTl, 1975, (figure
drawn by authors)
.
decisive of these cases, Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc c v.
Kleppe
,
the Court of Appeals overturned a District Court ruling
and found that the SBA's implementation of the 8(a) program
was authorized by the Small Business Act of 1958, [Ref. 17,
p c 710] The lower court ruled that the 8(a) program was not
authorized by the Small Business Act and violated federal
statutes requiring competitive bidding in government procure-
ment, [Ref, 18, p. 201-203] Reversing this ruling, the Court
of Appeals held, inter alia, that the Small Business Act, in
addition to Congressional and Presidential mandates issued
15

after the passage of the Act, provides sufficient authority
for the SBA's program. [Ref. 17, p. 697] Review of the
Court of Appeal's decision was denied by the U. S. Supreme
Court on February 19, 1974. Recently, the Congress indicated
an increased interest in small business by passing a law
written by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, which directed the General Accounting Office
to make a study of SBA's administration of all small business
programs. [Ref. 15] The first audit interest of GAO was
the S(a) program and a report reflecting the results of the
audit was issued on April 16, 1975* The GAO generally sup-
ported the program, although it indicated the existence of
considerable potential for improvement in the administration
of the program. [Ref. 7] Congressional hearings on the
GAO report and findings were, at the time of this writing,
being scheduled by the Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and
Minority Enterprise, of the House Committee on Small Business.
The GAO indicated that hearings were anticipated before other
committees as well.
In view of the strong interest and support shown in the
past by the Congress and the Executive Branch, and considering
the lack of success in the courts by challengers to the 8(a)
program, it is the opinion of the authors that the Congres-
sional hearings will not result in legislation to the detri-
ment of the program, but rather that the program will be a
viable one for the future.
16

It is therefore the philosophy of the authors that the
B(a) program will continue to be used to aid minorities and,
ergo, be in existence for the foreseeable future. The authors
also believe the basic intent of the £(a) program to be
sound. Promoting the establishment and growth of minority-
firms will benefit not only those minority firms aided, but
in the future, the entire country. Nevertheless, the present
method of using a system designed for procurement, i.e , the
Navy's shore facilities construction and maintenance acquisi-
tion system, for social purposes creates certain inherent
inefficiencies in operation. The primary objective of the
Navy's acquisition system is to procure goods and services
at the right price, in the right quantity, at the right
quality, in a timely fashion to satisfy the needs of the Navy.
The traditional philosophy of the government procurement
system has been that the formal advertising process is the
surest method of meeting this objective. The 6(a) program,
however, is based on using a negotiated process involving
limited competition in which price is not a factor to meet
its objective of promoting the establishment and growth of
minority firms who in many cases have little or no prior
experience in contracting. The program thus appears to run
counter to the basic philosophy of the procurement system
and creates considerable conflict in the minds of the pro-
curement personnel involved. In the final chapter of this
thesis, the authors present an alternative to the 6(a) program
which they believe will resolve this conflict and act for the
17

benefit of both the minority contractor and the procuring
agency. Nonetheless, guided by the philosophy that the pro-
gram would remain in effect, the authors examined the existing
system to determine improvements and changes in existing pro-
cedures which would enable the Navy to provide optimal support
to the 3(a) program.
In searching for the optimum implementation system, the
original intent of Congress in granting the 8(a) authority,
as presented in Chapter II, is used as a base to measure pro-
gram effectiveness. Chapter II also includes a review of the
legal challenges to the program and the court rulings on the
challenges o Chapter III traces through the present operation
of the program, highlights problems which exist in adminis-
tering the system, and presents recommendations for altering
or changing the present system
Chapter IV discusses the support given the program by
the Navy, addressing in particular that provided by the Naval
Facilities Engineering Commando The factors which influence
the level of support which an agency can provide the 3(a)
program are discussed and a system recommended which will
account for these factors.
The concluding chapter is designed to bring the various
sections of the thesis together. This chapter lists criteria
which must be met before the program can be successful, sum-





A. AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTENT OF THE SBA PROGRAM TO
AID MINORITY CONTRACTORS
In order to gauge the effectiveness of any program, it
is necessary that the original concept and the modifications
through useage of the program be fully understood. Complete
comprehension of the objectives of the 8(a) program requires
an examination as to whether the intent and goals of the
program in its pragmatic maturity are consistent with those
of the program as originally conceived and planned. To
address this question, the intent of the authors of the 8(a)
legislation, and the Small Business Act (PL $5-536) , which
set forth the 8(a) authority, must be examined » This intent
can then be compared with the present use of 8(a) by the
Small Business Administration wherein the program is re-
stricted to small businesses owned or destined to be owned
by socially or economically disadvantaged persons.
The Small Business Act was not the first legislation
enacted by the Congress to provide powers similar to 8(a) to
aid small businesses. Therefore, a better indication of Con-
gressional intent will be provided by reviewing the objectives
of Congress in all of its legislation directed at small
business. The objectives of Congress in using the Small
Business Administration to express its concern for minorities
must also be addressed in order to better understand any
conflicts which arise from using one program to realize two
19

objectives; i.e , to aid all small businesses, and to aid
minorities. These two objectives are at cross purposes. The
primary objective of the SBA is to represent the interests
of all small businessmen, while the £(a) program as it is
being practiced by the SBA appears to oppose these interests
by seeking to aid minority firms through a reapportionment
of the existing distribution of government contracts. Some
of these contracts represent a current source of revenue to
non-minority small business.
An overview of the legislative history of these two
objectives is provided in Figure 2 which also indicates the
nature of the conflicts which ensued when the SBA program was
used to express twin concerns of the Congress. This chapter
will trace the two expressions of Congressional concern
indicated in Figure 2 from their inception to the present,
and will then examine the legal challenges which were a mani-
festation of the conflict between the two objectives. The
problems encountered in the implementation and administration
of the program will be examined in the following chapter.
Figure 2 will be found on the following page.
1. World "War II
Congressional concern with a small business concept
was first expressed at the beginning of World War II in a
public law, directed at mobilizing the productive capacity
of the nation's small business concerns. [Refo 8] The Act
was an expression of Congressional desire to ensure that the
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concerns in the augmentation of the war effort. This Act
established the Smaller War Plants Corporation and provided
it with the authority to enter into contracts with other
government agencies obligating the Corporation to furnish
articles, equipment, supplies, or materjals to such agencies.
Performance of the contracts was to be effected by the
Corporation letting subcontracts to small business concerns
for the manufacture, supply, or assembly of such items.
[Ref • 3] Under this program, some 260 subcontracts totaling
$35.5 million were awarded to small business concerns, [Ref
*
5, p. 407]
2. The Korean War
The Defense Production Act of 1950 [Ref. 9] provided
a modification of Congressional interest in small business.
The interest, expressed earlier, during World War II, in full
utilization for the war effort of existing small business
was augmented by an indication of concern for the protection
of small business. The objective of the Act was to expand
the country's productive facilities so as to meet the military
demands of the Korean conflict without placing undue strain
on the civilian sector of the economy. It was the sense of
Congress that small business be encouraged to make the greatest
possible contribution towards achieving this objective and
that at least equal consideration be given them in the govern-
ment's drive to meet the war demands. [Ref. 9]
The Defense Production Act was amended in July 1951
[Ref. 13] to provide a further vehicle for the implementation
22

of the Act's objectives in the form of the Small Defense
Plants Administration, The SDPA's powers included the
authority to contract with other government agencies, and
in turn, obtain performance of the contract requirements
through subcontracts with small business. In this Act, Con-
gressional policy regarding small business directed that a
fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for
supplies and services for the government should be placed
with small business concerns. The restriction to times of
war was also removed. [Ref. 13] Reports to Congress in
1953 indicated that the SDPA awarded enly 7 contracts during
its tenure. [Ref. 5, p» 407]
3. Creation of the SBA
The Congress continued to broaden its policy of
aiding small business when it established the Small Business
Administration in 1953 and granted to it subcontracting
authority similar to that of the Small Defense Plants Adminis-
tration. This was accomplished through the Small Business
Act of 1953 (PL&3-163) which followed by one month an amend-
ment to the Defense Production Act (PL83-95) directing the
termination and liquidation of the Small Defense Plants
Administration. The use of the authority granted the SBA
was no longer to be restricted to the mobilization of the
nation's full productive capacity or support of the national
defense program, but rather was to be used to encourage and
develop the actual and potential capacity of small business
to ensure the economic well-being and security of the nation
23

through the preservation and expansion of free competition.
To accomplish this goal the Congress declared that the Govern-
ment should aid, counsel, and protect insofar as possible,
the interests of small business concerns.
Although the substance of 8(a) authority was contained
in the 1953 Act, the Congress reiterated its intent in the
195^ Small Business Act (PL85-536) , wherein it presented the
procedures and authority of 8(a) in its present format. The
1958 Act contained essentially all the provisions of the 1953
Act in a revised format with some small but important changes,
plus additional provisions directing the attention of the SBA
toward ensuring the participation of small business concerns
in research and development contracts. One of the changes
to the 1953 Act of importance to this thesis was the specific
declaration providing the SBA authority to utilize 8(a) when-
ever it determined such action necessary. Apparently Congress
desired to clearly indicate there were no restrictions to
the use of 8(a) even though no restrictions were contained in
the 1953 Small Business Act. The net result of the 1958 Act
was to create an agency, the Small Business Administration,
which was to be the chief Federal advocate for all small
businessmen, and in a stronger capacity than any of its
predecessors.
Thus, by the late 1950's the intent of Congress re-
garding small business bad been modified from its original
concern of ensuring the full utilization of existing small
business to support the war effort, and had evolved to an
objective of supporting and promoting the viability of small
24

businesses in peacetime as well as war by ensuring them a
fair proportion of all Government procurement* No specific
attention was directed toward the minority groups or the
socially or economically disadvantaged. In view of the
generally "low profile" on the national level of minority
groups during this period, it is the judgement of the writers
that the failure of Congress to specifically address their
needs in the Small Business Act was not an intentional omis-
sion on the part of Congress, but rather reflected the tempo
of the times,
4. Civil Rights Pressure
The 1960's brought the various civil rights issues
to the forefront and the Congress began to reflect its aware-
ness of the national concern in this area in the legislation
which it passed. The Congressional interest regarding
minority small business was manifested in the 19&7 Amendment
to the Economic Opportunity Act (PL90-222). The purpose of
this Act was to promote the full use of all existing govern-
ment programs and procedures toward a goal of enabling low
income families and individuals to secure the skills and
knowledge necessary to obtain the opportunities needed for
them to become self-sufficient. The Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare Report accompanying the Act
specifically included "minority group members, especially in
the ghetto," in these income groups. By this Act, the SBA
was directed to assist in the establishment, preservation,
and strengthening of small business firms "with special
attention to small business concerns: (1) located in urban
25

areas with high proportions of unemployed or low-income
individuals or, (2) owned by low-income individuals," [Ref.
17, p. 705]
5 • Use of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act
Shortly after the passage of the Amendment to the
Equal Opportunity Act, President Johnson expressed further
concern of the Executive branch with the implementation in
October 19&7 of the President's Test Cities Program, Using
the SBA's 3(a) authority for the first time in 14 years, the
program was aimed at providing jobs and training for the
hard-core unemployed through the award of 8(a) subcontracts
to both large and small business manufacturing firms.
Early in the program, the SBA became concerned that
simply creating jobs might be an inadequate method of ensuring
that hardcore unemployed would become part of America's
economic mainstream. The SBA then focused its attention on
business ownership opportunities as offering a better route
to the economic mainstream for the minority and low-income
people. In the following year, the SBA changed its objective
to one of establishing and promoting the growth of minority-
business firms. This change coincided with the issuance of
Executive Order 11458, instructing the appropriate Federal
departments and agencies to establish programs to strengthen
minority business enterprises
o
A formal statement of its new objectives was set
forth in 1970 when the Small Business Administration promul-
gated new regulations establishing the 3(a) program as a
vehicle for providing assistance only to small business
26

concerns owned or controlled by socially or economically dis-
advantaged persons (13 CFR 124o3-l(c)). Concurrent with the
issuance of these regulations, the President issued another
Executive Order (1151S) calling for increased representation
of the interests of small business concerns, particularly
minority owned business concerns within Federal agencies and
departments. The concern expressed by the President in his
Executive Order was supported by a Department of Commerce
report to the President on minority business enterprise in
June of 1970, Statistics in the report indicated that at the
time, the minorities in question made up about l6ffo of the
population, but accounted for only three (3) percentage of
the 5,500,000 businesses in this country . [Ref. 5] A third
order (Executive Order 11625), issued October 13, 1971,
directed all Federal departments and agencies to continue
all existing efforts to foster and promote minority business
enterprises, and also endorsed the definition of a minority
business firm provided by the SBA in its 1970 regulations as
being "one owned or controlled by socially or economically
disadvantaged persons,"
Congress revised the emphasis of the Small Business
Act in a 1974 amendment. This amendment (PL93--336) did not
change the $(a) section of the original Act, but did revise
the loan policies set forth in the Act, The change directed
the SBA to give special attention to the needs of small busi-
ness concerns located in areas of high unemployment or low-
income, and the needs of small businesses owned by low-income
individuals. Interpreting this amendment as support for the
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SBA's concern for minority firms, and noting that there has
been no Congressional legislation specifically countering the
SBA's application of Section 8(a), it is reasonable to con-
clude that SBA's interpretation is consistent with present
Congressional intent,
B. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF 8(a)
Challenges to the SBA's use of the 8(a) program have been
made both in and out of the courts. In 1969, several federal
agencies questioned the efforts of the SBA to use its 3(a)
authority for construction contracts. The agencies objected
on the grounds that the wording of section 3(a), i.e., *'. • .
to furnish articles, equipment, supplies, or material , . ."
did not specifically list construction contracts© In response
to these questions, the SBA requested a decision from the
Comptroller General* In his decision (B-13274 of October 2,
1969) the Comptroller General made it clear that the program
applied across the board to all types of procurement 'including
construction, supply, and service contracts.
In the courts, there have been several cases challenging
the Small Business Administration in its application of section
3(a). Plaintiff's challenges included, alleged discrimination,
Kleen-Rite Janitorial Servs. v. Laird, Civil No. 71-
1988-W (D. Mass., Sept. 21, 1971)
o
Space Services, Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 15170 (Do Conn.
August IS, 1972).
Fortec Construction v. Kleppe, 41 U0S0L.W0 2195 (D. D. C,
October 1, 1972)
Pacific Coast Utility Serv., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No« C-
71-1035 LHB,(N.D. Gal., 1971).
Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. et. al. v. Thomas S.
Kleppe, Administrator, Small Business Administration, et . al.,




unauthorized use of 8(a) procedures, use during periods of
non-emergency, illegal use of negotiation procedures, and
allegations of favoritism on the part of the SBA. The case
of Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe (477 F.2d 696
(1973)) was the most comprehensive, as it considered all of
the most important legal questions raised about the program
to date. In its ruling of April 18, 1973, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned a District Court ruling and found
that the SBA's implementation of the 8(a) program was
authorized by the Small Business Act of 195$° [Ref. 17, p.
697] Review of the Court of Appeal's decision was denied
by the U. S. Supreme Court on February 19, 1974* In its
ruling, the Appeals Court provided the following opinions
regarding the aforementioned challenges:
Challenge: That the section 8(a) program as administered
by the SBA was being restricted to minority firms and was
therefore unauthorized because such use is not specifically
mentioned in the statute.
Ruling:
This argument is without merit. The complex and
volatile nature of problems, including allocation of
government procurement contracts, often causes Congress
to cast its statutory provisions in general terms,
leaving to the agency the task of spelling out the
specific regulations and programs ... Congress has
declared that the actual and potential capacity of
small business concerns must be developed and that
a fair proportion of total purchases and contracts
of the federal government must be placed with such
firms ... The SBA has responded by adopting a
program which reflects its judgement of priorities
in light of current facts.
Challenge: That it is illegal for the SBA to direct the





There is ample indication that small business
concerns owned by disadvantaged persons have tra-
ditionally received a disproportionally small number
of government procurement contracts. It is certainly
reasonable, therefore, for the SBA to make a special
effort to alleviate this imbalance ... It is well
settled that an agency need not 'strike at all evils
at the same time' Semler v Dental Examiners, 1935, 29A-
U. So 608, 610, 55 S.Ct. 570, 571, 79 L.Ed. 1086, but
'reform may take one step at a time, addressing
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute.
'
Challenge: That the section 8(a) authority was intended
only for use during periods of national emergency.
Ruling:
There can be no more reliable an indication
of legislative intent than the specific statutory
words selected by Congress in delineating the powers
conferredo Section 8(a) unambiguously provides that
the SBA is empowered to act 'whenever it determines
that such action is necessary.' 15 U.S.C.§637 (a)°
This broad mandate answers the argument that Congress
intended to restrict section 8(a) to periods of
emergency
Challenge: That the authorization to negotiate in lieu
of competitive bidding is in violation of ether government
statutes.
Two separate issues are involved in this challenge. The
first being the authority of a government agency to remove
a contract from the broad competitive field of formal adver-
tising and award to the SBA thru negotiation; and the second
being the right of the SBA to award the subcontract to one
of its eligible subcontractors by negotiation in lieu of





Section £(a) empowers the SBA to arrange for
the performance of prime contracts by 'negotiating
or otherwise letting subcontracts,, ' 15 U.S.C. §
637(a)(2). The statute does not require the SBA
to engage in competitive bidding ... statutes
requiring competition in government procurement • •
recognize, however, that competition may be dis-
pensed with when other statutes so provide, 41
U.S.C. §252(c)(15)i or when the purposes of the
relevant program make it impractical to secure
competition. 41 U.S0C0 §252(c)(10). Both excep-
tions are applicable here.
First, section 3(a) of the Small Business Act
clearly constitutes specific statutory authority to
dispense with competition. 15 U.SoC. §637(a).
It provides that the SBA may let subcontracts by
negotiation or any other method.
Second, competition is impractical in the
present case. The purpose of the Act is to assist
small business concerns. The Act is based on the
premise that such firms are unable to compete
effectively in the marketplace and therefore cannot
secure government procurement contracts awarded
through competitive bidding. By increasing their
participation in government procurement, however,
these firms can eventually become self-sufficient,
viable businesses capable of competing effectively
in the marketplace. Private negotiation of sub-
contracts is the best means of accomplishing this
goal. To require competitive bidding would be
contrary to the basic rationale of the Act. Even
if competition were limited to small business con-
cerns, there would still be many small business
concerns that would never receive government pro-
curement contracts. This result would clearly frus-
trate the Congressional intent to assist small business.
Challenge: That the loss of formally bid contracts by
a competitor to the SBA subcontractor as a result of the sub-
contractor gaining a competitive edge through his SBA $(a)
contract is an unconstitutional violation of due process
The plaintiff argued that the subcontractor received a
premium on his SBA 3(a) contract and that this premium was
used to underwrite costs, thereby, enabling him to underbid
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his competitors on other work offered through the formal adver-
tising process. Thus, the government's action in awarding
the contract to the SBA subcontractor deprived the plaintiff
of his rights without due process of law c
Ruling:
. • • we cannot accept the plaintiff's argument
that the section $(a) program is unconstitutional be-
cause the plaintiffs may be disadvantaged competitively
There is no constitutional duty to offer government
procurement contracts for competitive bidding. The
SBA has the statutory authority to assist small busi-
ness concerns through private placements of contracts.
We have held that the SBA has not abused its discre-
tion in adopting the B(a) program. The program may
produce some inequalities among small business con-
cerns as a class. But in the area of socio-economic
legislation, the government's action must be upheld
if it is related to a proper government purpose.
Challenge: That the $(a) program as currently executed
is illegal in that it lacks objective criteria other than
those of race, color, or ethnic origin for the identification
of those persons who are deemed to be "socially or economically
disadvantaged."
To date, the courts have not ruled on this issue as none
of the challengers have been found to have standing to liti-
gate. Although the challengers have attempted to present con-
siderable data indicating the very small percentage of whites
in the program in support of their charge of discrimination,
the courts have ruled that to charge discrimination, the
plaintiffs, themselves, must have applied for the 8(a) program
and been rejected on the basis charged above. Since the
challengers had either not applied, or had applied and been
accepted, they had no grounds to charge that they had been
discriminated against. As they had not incurred nor were
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in danger of incurring some direct and personal injury re-
sulting from a statutory or constitutional right designed to
protect them, the plaintiffs had no standing to litigate.
[Ref. 17, p. 710]
III. PROGRAM DYNAMICS AND PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION
A. ORGANIZATIONAL REGULATIONS AND VIEWPOINTS
To make meaningful comments regarding problems either
encountered during implementation or inherent to the program,
it is necessary to have an adequate understanding of the
directives and rules under which it operates and the
philosophies and viewpoints of the participants. To accom-
plish this, the actual mechanics of the operating procedures
employed by the Small Business Administration and the Depart-
ment of Defense and its components in their execution of the
program must be examined. The SBA and DOD each have their
own regulations by which they must operate. In examining the
mechanics of the program, the requirements of each set of
regulations will be compared to note differences which might
create obstacles inhibiting cooperation between the SBA and
DOD. Where actual practice differs from the stated regula-
tions, this will also be noted. Recommendations for changes
to these procedures and other comments are presented,
lc Regulations
Procurement within the Department of Defense (DOD)
is accomplished in accordance with the policies and procedures
outlined in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations,
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better known as the ASPR. These regulations may be supple-
mented by subordinate directives issued by departments and
offices within DOD, but the ASPR remains the controlling
directive and will be used in this comparison.
Procedures which the Small Business Administration
follows in its implementation of the 3(a) program are found
in Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part
124o The 1975 edition of the CFR outlines the current pro-
cedures. Supplementing the CFR are Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP) issued by the Small Business Administration,
The SOP was used as the reference for SBA regulations together
with the CFR.
2« Viewpoints
Implementation of these regulations is affected by
the interests and philosophies of the various participants
in the program. For the purpose of this thesis, the parti-
cipants considered include not only DOB, the Navy, and the
SBA, but also the minority subcontractor, and indirectly the
Congress,
The contractor views the program in terms of the
benefits, either long or short range, which he receives from
it. For the contractor looking for long range benefits, the
3(a) program may well raise high expectations Aware that
the government is the largest single buyer of products and
services, the contractor may look upon the program as a sure
means to propel him into the economic mainstream of American
life. To accomplish this, he will expect the SBA to provide
adequate support in the form of contracts and management
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assistance. Failure of the program to live up to these
expectations can result in an embittered and disappointed
contractor. The net effect of such a failure will result in
a situation more unsatisfactory than that which would have
occurred had there been no program at all. On the other
hand, some contractors will view the program only from the
short range and enter the program to make a quick profit and
therefore will not expect nor necessarily desire SBA manage-
ment assistance. While they will suffer disappointment only
in the event that they fail to make a profit, their dis-
appointment will be minimal compared to those who have invested
considerable time and effort in an attempt to establish a
viable business.
The philosophy of the SBA is to a large degree in-
fluenced by external political pressures to produce results.
In the early stages of the $(a) program, these results were
most easily demonstrated by the dollar value of contracts
awarded and the number of contractors in the program. This
method of measuring program effectiveness produced a philosophy,
particularly at the District level, of awarding a large total
dollar value of contracts and bringing more contractors into
the programs, Recent attention to the small number of graduates
since the initiation of the current program has resulted in
a change to this philosophy. Results are now to be measured
Graduates are contractors who have completed the $(a) pro-




by the number of graduates from the program. This change
in the effectiveness measure will undoubtably result in a
shift of the SBA's philosophy towards more active concern
for the quality and quantity of the assistance provided the
individual contractor.
The SBA philosophy and policies are also influenced
by the resources provided them to meet their objective.
Although the theoretical philosophy of Congress regarding
8(a) has been well documented in the intent section of this
thesis, the Congress's pragmatic philosophy is expressed by
the amount of funds which they appropriate to support the
8(a) program. These funds, which are sufficient to provide
only a specific SBA staffing and level of contractor support,
implicitly limit the number of contractors who can be admitted,
to the program and be given adequate management assistance.
In considering the Navy's philosophy regarding 8(a)
there are two levels within the Navy which must be considered.
One level is at the top where the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Installations and Logistics (ASN(I&L)) has the
responsibility for establishing Navy policy and goals re-
garding the program. The second level is in the lower
echelons where the procurement offices are involved with the
operational aspects of the program.
The ASN(I&L) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(I&L), who administer the program for their respective
Secretaries, are grouped together for discussion purposes
because of similarities in philosophies. Loth Secretaries
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(Defense & Navy) are more concerned with the support accorded
the program than the end results achieved, i.e., producing
viable minority firms. This is not to imply that they are
unconcerned with the end results, but it is their philosophy
that the Navy's duty is to provide contractual support for
the program to the maximum extent possible, rather than
judge the optimality of the program as a vehicle for pro-
ducing established minority businesses. In the words of one
official in the office of ASN(l&L),
... the Navy should give the 3(a) program a fair
chance by providing the assistance requested. If the
future reveals that the 3(a) program is not the most
effective means for producing successful minority firms,
it should be abolished and a new method tried. We can-
not truly ascertain its success, however, unless we
support the program to the best of our ability.
The philosophy of the Navy's procurement offices is
to meet their objective of obtaining goods and services in
the right quantity, at the right quality, for the right
price, in a timely fashion to satisfy the Navy's logistical
requirements. Although the procurement offices are assigned
targets for 3(a) awards, their primary concern is to obtain
the required product in a manner consistent with the afore-
mentioned parameters. Procurement officers generally support
the objectives of the 3(a) program, but are reluctant to
have a requirement filled through an 3(a) contract if they
believe they will have to pay a higher price or will receive




B. THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE 8(a) PROGRAM
In reviewing the program procedures, both prescribed
and de facto, the primary requirement for assessing the
importance of any differences or problem areas as well as
the correctness, completeness, and even the order of the
steps within the procedure, is a knowledge of the goals and/
or objectives of the program. As there are two primary
support areas for the program, the SBA and the procuring
agencies, in this case the U. S. Navy, a look at the goals
and objectives of each is in order.
1. The SBA*s Goals
The SBA's objective for the 8(a) program, as expressed
in the Code of Federal Regulations, is to assist small busi-
ness concerns owned and controlled by socially or economically
disadvantaged persons to achieve a competitive position in
the marketplace. The specific intermediate goals by which
this objective will be obtained, however, are not so clearly
stated. In the past, the specific intermediate goals have
been primarily to encourage the growth of the program by a
general increase in the support provided by the procuring
agencies. These goals were expressed in the form of increases
to the total dollar volume of contracts awarded for each
year e A by-product of the concern toward increasing the
total value of contracts awarded was to increase the number
of contractors in the program.
The initial goals were set for the SBA by the Advisory
Council for Minority Business Enterprise, established in 1971«
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[Ref. 33] Subsequent goals were generated, within the SBA
based on consideration of the previous year's performance,
the projected level of SBA staffing, and to a small degree
the SBA's portfolio of contractors. The number of contractors
to be in the program was generated on the basis of how many
contractors it would take to perform the workload, expressed
in the dollar volume of contracts. Recognition of higher-
concentrations of minorities in certain sections of the
nation was given when the total goal was broken down and
assigned to various SBA Regional and District officeso
A new concept of goals, in the form of program com-
pletions, i.e,, minority firms which graduate as viable
businesses, was introduced in FY 75 • [Ref, 7, p, 72] The
SBA has established a goal of 126 graduates by the end of
that fiscal year under this new concept,
2, Navy Goals
The Navy's overall objective has been to support- the
program. Yearly goals for increases in the dollar amount of
8(a) awards by Navy commands were directed by the Assistant
Secretar3r of the Navy (I&L), The goals were expressed in
the form of percentage increases over the previous year's
8(a) output. Recent goals were a 25$ increase for FY 73,
10$ for FY 74, and a 20$ for FY 75. [Refs. 26, 16 and 27]
Establishment of these goals is not independent of the SBA's
goals. The SBA's new objective for the forthcoming year is
presented to the Interagency Task Force on Procurement for
Minority Business, a task force appointed by the Interagency
Council for Minority Business Enterprise. (The former
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Advisory Council for Minority Business Enterprise.) This
Task Force is made up of representatives from each of the
procuring agencies and the SBA. The impact of the SBA's
goals on the agencies and their ability to support these goals
is discussed. Upon agreement with the SBA's goals, as has
been the case to date, each agency indicates what the extent
of its support will be c The Department of Defense has, in
the past, relayed this goal to the individual services with-
out specifying the support each will provide. For FY 75 }
however, each service was given a specific target in support
of the DOD goal. [Ref . 25] The DOD instructions to the
services concerning these goals have not directed attention
to any specific areas of contracting. One exception to
this occurred in 1972 when a memorandum by then Assistant
Secretary of Defense (installations and Logistics) Barry
Shillito urged increased attention in the construction area.
[Ref. 26] No specific guidance as to amount however, was
given in this area.
3 • The Need for New Goals
The present efforts of the Small Business Administra-
tion to develop new goals, using program completion as a
measurement, is commendable and the authors support the effort,
even though the details of the new goals are not yet known.
The lack of any objectives, during the early years, expressed
in terms of measuring end results of the program, while not
desirable, is not necessarily damaging. The knowledge that
it would be a few years before any contractors completed the
program, gave the SBA a period of time in which to concentrate
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their limited resources on the problems involved in developing
the procedural details of the program. While the 3(a) authority
itself was relatively well understood by all involved, the
detailed portion of the program dealing with the criteria
for admission, the extent of management assistance necessary,
and the general overall learning curve connected with the
program were yet to be established Though it may be argued
that the initial establishment of specific graduation goals
would have provided incentive to hasten the development of
the program, it can also be argued that this type of goal
would have created undue pressure on the SBA to prematurely
graduate contractors. This effect would have been to the
detriment of the program during its early development. Con-
versely, the establishment of graduation goals for fiscal
year 1975 was none too soon. The early entrants into the
program have been in long enough that some method of measuring
their progress was sorely needed, WTith the development of
criteria for determining program completion, contractors*
eligibility for graduation would seem to be a very sound
indicator of their progress. Imposed late in the contractor's
development phase, graduation pressures will also serve as
an introduction to the pressures he will encounter once he
has graduated and is on his own. The SBA has cautioned,
however, that attainment of the goal of 126 graduates during
this period of severe economic malaise should not be given
high expectations. All businesses have suffered severe set-
backs and the S(a) contractors are even more susceptible.
The authors concur with this assessment
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In addition to the development of graduation goals,
it is recommended that the SBA implement a follow-up program
to monitor the continued viability of contractors for a given
period of time following graduation. Official concern for
a sustained measure of success should counteract efforts to
graduate contractors too soon c Expectations of long-term
viability should be reconciled, however, with recognition
of the high failure rate of small business as a whole
Another concept SBA is considering, is halting the
increase in the number of contractors in the program and
concentrating on putting its resources to the best use in
ensuring the optimal development of the contractors already
in the program. This concept acknowledges the fact that
the SBA has limited resources available to support the pro-
gram and has had only moderate success in increasing these
resources* The SBA originally proposed limiting the number
of contractors in the program to 1500 and the total contract
support to $250 million per year. [Ref. 7, p. 17] This
proposal was subsequently modified to reduce the number of
contractors to 1260 as a result of reductions in the SBA
staff to support the program. [Ref. 35» p» 4] To ensure
that their efforts are put to the best use, the SBA's District
offices have been directed to review their current contractors
and retain only those that are showing progress. Concurrently,
the Districts are developing agency support requirements for
these contractors based on the contractor's individual pro-
jected needs. The SBA will then be able, for the first time,
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to base its total dollar volume goal on the actual needs of
the contractors. An argument may be advanced that the SBA,
by pursuing such a policy, may be eliminating those con-
tractors who need help the most • This argument is discussed
in a later section of this thesis which addresses the effect
of resource limitations.
Three recommendations regarding goals follow. A
recent General Accounting Office study of the 8(a) program
[Ref. 7, p* 10] found that the contractors have been chroni-
cally undersupported with respect to the needs projected in
their business plans. The $250 million in support for 1260
contractors proposed by the SBA will result in less support
and more contractors than in FY 74 when the GAO found $272
million to be inadequate support for 1132 contractors.
The first recommendation, therefore, is that the
SBA disregard its goal of $250 million in contract awards
and instead use the actual needs of the contractors to be in
the program as a goal. In this case, the needs of the con-
tractor are measured by the projected dollar amount of 8(a)
contracts he will require to attain self-sufficiency. These
needs are included in his business plan which will be dis-
cussed later in the thesis. If this figure is too high for
acceptance by the Interagency Task Force on Procurement for
Minority Business, the number of contractors should be
further reduced to correlate with the reduced amount of con-
tractual support agreed to by the Task Force, There should
be no more contractors in the program than the number whose
needs can be fully met. It seems illogical to fail to
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provide a contractor the support he needs and at the same
time expect him to succeed.
The second recommendation is a corollary of the
first and requires that the limit on the number of contractors
in the program not be set at 1500 or 1260 but rather deter-
mined by the contract support which the agencies provide
the SBA and the management assistance which the SBA can
provide the contractors.
The third recommendation relates to the earlier recom-
mendation that the SBA implement a follow-up program to moni-
tor the continued viability of contractors for a given
period of time following graduation. In developing this
monitoring program, definitive, measurable criteria must be
established to determine what is meant by viability. The
authors recommend that the SBA develop such criteria, but
fully realize that their development is a task of no small
proportion. Nevertheless, if the effectiveness of the program
is to be accurately measured, the generation of criteria
must be undertaken. Even though an outside observer may not
agree with the resultant criteria, he will at least know
upon what measure the success of the program is based.
C. ELIGIBILITY FOR ENTRY INTO THE PROGRAM
The program as outlined in the regulations may be con-
sidered as a cycle in which the needs of the £(a) contractor
are determined, procurement requirements supporting these
needs are identified and provided to meet these needs,
and the process repeated until such time as the contractor
is adjudged ready to graduate from the program and
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compete on his own in the private sector. This cycle places
the burden of initiating the program on the Small Business
Administration. Both the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
and the Armed Forces Procurement Regulations (ASPR) clearly
indicate that only the SBA has authority to bring a con-
tractor into the program, although the Department of Defense
and other government agencies may refer interested parties
to the SBAo The ASPR, however, contains no provision con-
cerning the entry of contractors into the program, other
than a requirement that they be certified competent by the
SBA prior to receiving a contract© All directives concerning
eligibility and the entry process are contained in the CFR
and the SBA's SOP 60 41 1.
The only eligibility requirements stipulated in the CFR
for entry into the 8(a) program are that the small business
concern must be owned and controlled by one or more socially
or economically disadvantaged persons. Viewing this as
two basic criteria, ownership and control on one hand and
social or economic disadvantage on the other, the latter will
be considered first.
1. Socially or Economically Disadvantaged
The CFR ( § 124. S-l) amplifies its definition of
"disadvantaged** by stating that:
Such disadvantage may arise from cultural, social,
chronic economic circumstances or background, or other
similar cause. Such persons include, but are not limited
to, black Americans, American Indians, Spanish Americans,
oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts. Vietnam-era
service in the Armed Forces may be a contributing
factor in establishing social or economic disadvantage.
[Ref. 41, p. 176]
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The use by the SBA of the words socially or economically
disadvantaged as opposed to socially and economically dis-
advantaged greatly expands the field of eligible firms. By
allowing a firm to be socially or economically disadvantaged,
the SBA grants program access to firms operated by relatively
affluent but socially disadvantaged persons. There is con-
siderable controversy as to the wisdom of this policy, and
the SBA was recently criticized by the General Accounting
Office for admitting firms with minority owners of relatively
high net worth into the program. [Ref. 7> p. 29] The SBA
maintains, however, that its policy is justified. The
philosophy underlying its argument was expressed by the SBA
Administrator, Mr. Thomas S. Kleppe in March 1974 in the SBA's
Report to the Subcommittee on Small Business of the Committee
on Banking and Currency*.
... Another question is what degree of economic
disadvantage is necessary to determine an individual's
eligibility to participate in the program? If a person
has been able to earn a salary above the national average,
should this disqualify him? If not, at what level of
economic affluence do we stop? However, if the program
objectives envision the lessening of the national im-
balance of business ownership between the disadvantaged
(basically minority group) and those in the non-dis-
advantaged class it will progress more efficiently by
including as owners those of the disadvantaged group
who have proven capabilities and greater potential
for success in business management. To date, SBA has
taken this approach even though vulnerable to the
anomaly of assisting the affluent disadvantaged.
Once again, this course is subjective, arbitrary
and varied. Yet any language the Agency can find
to be more precise inevitably results in discriminating
against a segment of the very group it is bound to assist.
In response to numerous criticisms about its lack of
more concrete eligibility criteria for the socially or
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economically disadvantaged, the SBA elaborated on the
definition provided in the CFR in an attempt to provide the
desired criteria. In its SOP 60 41 1, the SBA indicated
that where the eligibility criteria in the CFR was inadequate
to determine acceptance, consideration may also be given to:
1. Inability to obtain technical assistance, business
assistance, or financing,
2. Impediments and obstacles encountered in entering
into the economic mainstream resulting from discrimina-
tion or other circumstance,
3o Inability to compete effectively in the marketplace
because of restrictive practices on the part of financing
or commercial agents,
4« Frequency of unemployment or marginal employment
due to residence in depressed areas or past practices
of discrimination based on background or other
circumstances,
5» History of applicant income status,
[Ref. 36, p. 23]
In addition to the above criteria, it should also be noted
that firms owned by handicapped individuals are also eligible,
Even with this additional information, however, there remains
a considerable amount of subjectivity in the selection of
firms deemed eligible for the $(a) program. The need to
exercise this subjectivity is increased by the limitations
on funds and personnel for the SBA because these limitations
will restrict the number of contractors who can be in the
program. This, in turn, requires the SBA to reject more
applicants.
Although all of the SBA criteria for program entry make
no mention of any specific requirement that the owners be
minorities, application of the criteria by the SBA appears
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to have essentially eliminated non-minorities. Table 2, on
the next page, indicates that from the inception of the pro-
gram through FY 74, the vast majority of contractors who
successfully met the above criteria and subsequently were
awarded contracts, were in fact, minorities.
2c Ownership and Control
With regard to the first part of its basic eligibility
criteria, that of ownership and control, the CFR notes that
the ownership may take one of several forms. [Ref. 44, p»
175] These include proprietorships, partnerships, and corpora-
tions. The SBA has clearly defined its meaning of ownership
in each of these instances by requiring that disadvantaged
persons maintain at least a 50^ interest in the case of
partnership, or in the case of a corporation, at least 51fo
of each class of voting stock. The SBA's meaning of control,
however, is not so clearly defined. The SOP implies that
control exists when the owners actively participate in the
management and operation of the firm. Unlike the definition
provided for ownership, however, this definition confers no
measurable meaning. To determine control, its meaning must
be specified in measurable terms o For example, does control
confer the power to set salaries, hire personnel, authorize
expenditures, etc? Without some definition of its meaning
of control, the SBA appears to have no measurement by which
to determine whether it exists. It is recommended that
if the SBA is to require control by disadvantaged persons,
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By requiring broth ownership and control, it appears
that SBA is attempting to prevent entry by firms which are
owned by disadvantaged persons, but are staffed and controlled
by non-disadvantaged persons who accrue the majority of the
benefits derived from the operation of the firm. "While this
requirement may prevent the entry of such "front" organiza-
tions, it also prevents the minority firm from obtaining
needed capital from non-disadvantaged persons.
3 • Effects of Resource Limitations
a. Sponsorship
A fourth type of ownership arrangement which the
SBA allows, that of the sponsor relationship was instituted
because of the SBA's limited resources and provides consider-
able insight into the complexities of the ownership and con-
trol, versus ownership or control question o Under this
arrangement, the SBA allows profit-oriented business sponsors
to assist 8(a) firms in managing their business operations
and to provide them with capital and t raining 6 With this
arrangement, the SBA can reduce the resources which it must
commit. In return for their assistance, sponsors obtain
limited stock ownership in 8(a) firms and/or receive fees
from the firms o The impact of this type of business firm on
the 8(a) program is indicated by the fact that sponsored firms
constitute only 3^ of the total number of firms in the program
since its inception, but performed 18$ of the total dollar
volume of contract awards. [Ref. 7, po 18] In addition to
providing insight to the ownership-control question, the
sponsorship program is also of interest as it was the most
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frequently criticized aspect of the 8(a) program by all the
Navy procurement personnel interviewed during research for
this thesis. The majority of the complaints centered around
charges that the sponsorship program was merely a "front,"
whereby established non-minority contractors could make
excessive profits by performing a contract negotiated to
help an inexperienced minority firm.
The recent report to Congress by GAO indicates
the program originated when the SBA began obtaining large
service-type contracts from procuring agencies for award
through the 8(a) program. [Ref. 7, p. 18] From the SBA's
view point, the large contracts were desirable as they enabled
the SBA to more easily meet its total dollar volume goals.
The administration of a few large contracts required less
of SBA's manpower and other resources for monitoring, training,
and management assistance, than would be required for many
small contracts with the same total dollar volume. Award of
these contracts, however, produced two significant problems
for the SBA. The first was that the small disadvantaged firms
usually lacked both capital and proper management talent to
successfully perform large contracts. The second problem was
that independent contractors who had previously received the
contracts competitively, realized they were losing contract
opportunities and, as a result, became highly critical of the
8(a) program. Efforts by the individual contractors to halt
these encroachments through the SBA, the courts, and the Con-
gress were to no avail. During their discussions with the SBA,
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the contractors became aware of the profit potential in be-
coming sponsors and decided to join rather than fight the
SBAo Support for the belief that profit was the primary in-
centive, was provided by the GAO's report that in interviews
with seven (7) sponsor firms, six (6) stated that they became
sponsors to make a profit and protect their livelihood. [Ref.
7, p. 19]
For the SBA, the appeal of the sponsorship pro-
gram was its ability to alleviate the 8(a) contractor's
demands on the SBA's limited resources by substituting the
sponsor as the focus of those demands • Thus, the sponsor-
ship program can be traced to Congressional staffing and
funding limitations,,
In addition to approving the sponsor program,
the SBA also promulgated further directives, which if properly
implemented would alleviate the validity of concern for their
livelihood as a reason for the independent firms to become
sponsors 6 These criteria noted that contracts would not be
accepted if there existed a significant possibility that a
small business concern would suffer a major hardship if the
procurement was removed from competition. In determining
this possibility the firm should have received at least one
award of a similar contract during the past year and be
dependent upon such recurring awards for a significant por-
tion of its overall sales. [Refo 36, p. 16] A second criteria
required that the SBA not accept contracts where in its judge-
ment, the percentage of procurements considered for 8(a)
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contracting is excessive in relation to the total purchases
of like or similar requirements of the government. [Ref. 36,
p. 16]
These same restrictions may also act to the detri-
ment of the 8(a) program by limiting the number of contracts
available to minority contractors. The need for proper inter-
pretation and application of these clauses is thus crucial
to the success of the program as failure to apply them
judiciously, could result in either of two extremes. On the
one hand, excessive concern for independent contractors would
greatly reduce the amount of contracts that would normally
be available for 8(a) consideration, while on the other hand,
excessive concern for the 8(a) firm would provide no protec-
tion to independent contractors greatly dependent on govern-
ment contracts o Although the restrictions do appear contrary
to the SBA's goal of aiding minority contractors, they are
consistent with the basic intent of Congress in passing the
Small Business Act, which was to aid all small businesses.
The SBA's efforts to aid one segment of the small business
community should not be to the detriment of the remaining
firms.
In evaluating the operation of the sponsor program
and the relationship between the sponsor and the disadvantaged
firm, the GAO reported several significant findings » The
majority of the sponsors indicated that while they desired
to develop the 8(a) firms into viable businesses, they did
not want them to become competitors but would prefer to keep
them dependent on the sponsors, [Ref. 7, Po 19] This desire
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to retain control affected the operational relationships
which the sponsors had established with the 8(a) firms. The
failure of the SBA to clearly define the criteria by which
the disadvantaged person's control of the firm would be
measured, resulted in a wide variety of operational relation-
ships between the sponsor and the firm. Although the firms
and their sponsors must submit a management agreement out-
lining the proposed relationship, the lack of specific require-
ments for detailed descriptions of services to be provided,
and the delineation of authority and responsibilities has
largely negated the value of the agreement. The GAO*s findings
included numerous instances where the sponsor maintained all
the financial records of the 8(a) firm; instances where the
sponsor prepared, wrote, and signed all the payroll checks
for the minority firm, and arrangements whereby sponsors
were authorized to make expenditures of minority firm funds
without obtaining co-signatures of the 8(a) firm officers
«
[Kef. 7, p. 20-21] The minority firm owners were frequently
limited to general supervision, maintenance of employee time
sheets, and informing the sponsor of financial peoblems.
[Ref. 7, p» 22] Even in the relatively simple area of estab-
lishing criteria for fees which the sponsors are permitted
to charge the 8(a) firms, the GAO noted that the SBA provides
no guidelines. Fees ranged from 6^tol6 6$ of the gross
revenues of the 8(a) firm. [Ref. 7, p. 23]
Although the GAO's findings may be indicative of
a need for tighter controls by the SBA over the sponsorship
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program, there is another interpretation of the findings.
The basic concept of the free enterprise system is competition.
Every business strives to outdo its competitors. This con-
cept is supported by the GAO's report that the majority of
the sponsors contacted indicated no desire to create com-
petitors o It thus appears contrary to the basic tenets of
free enterprise to genuinely expect a sponsor to encourage
an $(a) contractor to become a self-sufficient, growing firm.
While the sponsor may well enter the program to gain a profit
from the fees he will receive from the 3(a) firm, it appears
illogical to expect that he will actively strive for the
development of a contractor who could one day put him out
of business. Consciously or subconsciously, the sponsor
will obstruct the minority firm's progress. Evidence of this
is clearly provided in the GAO report.
The authors therefore recommend that the sponsor
program be discontinued. If this recommendation is not accepted,
however, and the sponsor program is to continue, the authors
concur strongly with the GAO recommendation that the SBA
clearly monitor the sponsor program. They also recommend
that the SBA establish more stringent guidelines regarding
the content of the management agreement to ensure that the
minority firm receives the proper training and guidance neces-
sary to enable it to become independent, and to ensure that
disadvantaged persons retain true control of the firm. Such
agreements could be constructed such that the sponsor receives
a fee contingent upon the S(a) firm becoming self-sufficient
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thereby providing the sponsor an incentive to aid in the growth
and establishment of the minority contractor.
The authors further suggest that if the SBA imple-
ments the degree of control required to provide assurance of
some degree of success for the sponsor program, the cost of
these controls in additional manhours and money, may well
offset any savings accrued by having sponsors provide manage-
ment assistance to contractors vice the SBA,
b. Impact on Contractors
As discussed earlier in this paper, the SBA planned
to limit the number of firms in the S(a) program and concen-
trate its limited resources on these firms. In the process
of limiting the number of contractors who participate in the
$(a) program, thereby requiring a reduction of contractors
presently involved, the SBA may be eliminating those con-
tractors who need help the most. Provided with limited funds,
the SBA has chosen a policy of attempting to help the maximum
number of contractors by concentrating on those with the best
chance of success o While it may be argued that they could
have chosen to take only a few who need a large amount of
assistance, the choice of which approach will most aid minorities
is subject to the opinion of the chooser.
The authors therefore recommend that the SBA, in
determining which contractors should be terminated from the
program, first examine all the other contractors in the pro-
gram to determine if some might better be served by other
SBA programs. Some of those 8(a) contractor.? who have developed
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to the point where they no longer need all the support
offered by the 8(a) program, may be able to have their needs
met by other SBA programs. By transferring these firms out
of the 8(a) program, more of the less experienced contractors
can be retained in the program.
By limiting the number of contractors who can be
in the program, the SBA also assumes the unenviable position
of deciding which contractors must be terminated or graduated
and which contractors will be admitted to the program.
Standards for admission, termination, and graduation are
discussed in later sections of this thesis, but regardless
of what criteria are used, there will no doubt be some
minority firms who will feel they were not given a fair
chance to participate in the 3(a) program. These feelings
will probably result in letters to Congressmen and other
persons of high authority. The alternative to limiting
the number of contractors in the 3(a) program is to allow
program entry of all socially or economically disadvantaged
firms who apply for 8(a) assistance and allocate existing
resources among them. Even with this alternative approach,
the decision as to who will be helped must still be made
unless there are adequate SBA resources and agency support
requirements to support all the contractors in the program.
When the needs of the contractors in the program exceed SBA
resources and supporting procurement requirements, a decision
must be made as to which contractors will be assisted. The
authors believe it unlikely that Congress will grant the
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SBA the required level of resources to support all potential
8(a) contractors, and equally unlikely that agency procure-
ment requirements would continue to be compatible with con-
tractor needs as these needs grow. Thus, the problem of
determining which contractors should be assisted is simply
delayed until after the contractor is in the program* Un-
limited entry would only increase the number of contractors
about whom this decision must be made* The authors believe
that delaying the decision to withhold assistance from a
contractor until after he is in the program will result in
greater animosity on the part of the contractor since he
will probably have more time, money;, and effort involved
than when he is seeking initial entry. The authors, there-
fore, concur with the SBA policy of limiting the number of
contractors in the program.
To determine who will be granted program entry,
the authors recommend that all firms applying for assistance
under the 8(a) program first be screened by the SBA to deter-
mine if they may be better served by other SBA or government
programs. If it is determined that the firm may be best
assisted by the 8(a) program, it should then be determined
if the firm is owned and controlled by socially or economically
disadvantaged persons. After verifying that the firm is
qualified for 8(a) assistance, a decision would then be made
by the SBA, based on definitive criteria, as to whether the
firm required SBA management assistance and/or a business
education orientation before receiving a cor tract,, Those
requiring assistance or education would be scheduled for
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whatever training is appropriate. Once again, the SBA
would be free to utilize other SBA or government programs to
provide or aid in this training. The personnel of SBA would,
however, still act as the focus and overall coordinator of
assistance for the firm. If the scheduling was for more
than, say 60 days in the future, the company wou3.d have to
reconfirm periodically with the SBA that it still desired
assistance, or else be eliminated from the schedule. This
system of reconfirmation would serve to eliminate those firms,
who in the future, decided not to participate in the program.
Firms not needing this training, and those that
complete the training outlined in the previous paragraph,
would go on a waiting list of firms that are ready to parti-
cipate in an actual contract „ As openings in the program
become available in the firm's area of expertise, the firm
would be admitted to the B(a) program.
D. THE BUSINESS PLAN
Although an applicant's eligibility for the 8(a) program
is determined by the criteria discussed previously, his
acceptance into the program depends on the submission and
approval of a business plan,
1. SBA Policy
Yfhere an applicant is found to be qualified in all
other aspects, if the SBA official believes the likelihood
of being able to provide sufficient contract support is
minimal, he should so inform the applicant and discourage him
from submitting a plan. This policy protects both the SBA
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and the contractor. The SBA avoids investing resources in
contractors who will never be in the program. Simultaneously,
the risk of an unnecessary expense to the contractor is
reduced as the SBA is not authorized to reimburse an appli-
cant for the expense involved in the preparation of a business
plan. The contractor is instead expected to amortize the
cost during the time he is in the program.
Assuming the likelihood of contract support, the
applicant is authorized to submit a business plan. The plan
is an extensive report which not only documents his eligibility
for the program in terms of his status as a disadvantaged
person and his ownership and control of the firm, but also
outlines how the $(a) subcontract assistance which he is
requesting will enable the firm to improve and expand its
capabilities in order to become self-sustained and profit-
oriented.
The preparation of this plan is not an easy task, but
the contractor is not required to prepare it alone. The SBA
offers training courses at their district offices on business
plan preparation and has considerable resources available
in terms of counseling and tutoring in all areas of small
business management.
2» Business Plan Content
The business plan provides information in eight
general areas about the applicant firm. [Ref. 36, p. 26-37]
The first area is a description of the proposed business in-
cluding the type, purpose, and goals of the firm. The
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second section of the plan provides background on the firm,
outlining the chronological development of the firm and
identifying and discussing significant problems and successes
during this period.
The next area discussed in the plan is that of the
ownership and control of the firm. All legal documents con-
nected with the founding of the firm are included, together
with an indication of the degree of ownership by each stock-
holder or officer. Of particular importance is the inclusion
of a listing by name of all officers and stockholders o The
SBA regulations require documentation of the dis-
advantaged status of these persons. The writers were en-
couraged to find during their visits to SBA District and
Regional offices, that some offices have addressed this point
in their business plans by including a requirement for this
information in the format. In its report, however, the GAO
indicated that this was not the case throughout the SBA.
Nonetheless, the efforts by some field offices to document
the evidence of disadvantage is commendable since the authors
also believed that some effort must be made in this area to
ensure that the assistance provided in the 8(a) program is
given to those for whom it was intendedo
The fourth section of the business plan contains infor-
mation about the product or service which the company proposes
to market, while the fifth section presents information on
management. Included in this information should be an organi-
zational chart, plus a description of all agreements or
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contracts for outside management and business consultants.
These management contracts must be approved by the Associate
Administrator for Procurement and Assistance.
The sixth section contains the heart of the business
plan as far as the procuring agencies are concerned. Covering
marketing, this section provides data on the anticipated
growth rate of the firm. This anticipated growth rate deter-
mines the amount of support which the firm will require from
the SBA in the form of B(a) subcontracts. The growth is
depicted in a graphic format as indicated in Figure 3«
Figure 3
3(a) Contract Support Requirements for a








Time in the program (years)
Source: Interview with Mr. Richard Beans, Small Business
Administration, Washington, D. C, 24 Feb. 1975*
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As can be seen in the ^raph, the plan requires that initially
the contractor receive a high proportion of his revenues
from the 8(a) contracts. As the firm grows, the percentage
of non 8(a) work increases until 8(a) support is no longer
required. Figure 2 is a hypothetical example and varies
depending on the firm, the industry, and other circumstances.
For example, one firm may graduate in three years while
another may require five years of support. This recognition
of the variation in time requirements between industries and
firms is a recent change in SBA policy. Prior to the change*
the policy was to limit the contractor's participation to
three years. The level of support also varies widely from
firm to firm, both in dollar value and percent of revenues.
This portion of the business plan is extremely crucial to
the success of the firm. An overestimate of total initial
contracts, if attained, may exceed the firm's capacity and
"result in poor performance. On the other hand, an under-
estimate of total initial contracts may result in the firm
being unable to recover its fixed costs, thereby incurring
a loss. A loss may also be incurred if the contractor over-
estimates his ability to obtain non 8(a) contracts c This will
require additional support by the SBA if the contractor is
to remain viable. An excessive growth rate can also create
problems as it can result in the firm's working capital and
management capabilities being exceeded. While none of these
events will necessarily result in the firm being dropped from
the program, they will require a reassessment and re-evalua-
tion of the plan. Although readjustments of the plan may be
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authorized if needed, they can be discouraging to the con-
tractor A careful analysis of the plan by the SBA is there-
fore required before approval, to ensure that this estimate
of growth for attaining a position in the competitive market
is realistic
o
The seventh section of the plan describes the facili-
ties and equipment which the firm either has or will need.
If any of the property is leased or rented, a copy of the
lease or rental agreement should be included.
The last section of the report covers the financial
aspects of the firm* A balance sheet and a profit and loss
statement for the current and last 3 years (if applicable)
must be preparedo A detailed indication of the firm's
financial needs for additional equipment, working capital, etc.
must be provided. Cash flow projections for each of the years
the contractor is in the program, must be produced along
with an explanation of how the firm proposes to finance per-
formance of its S(a) contracts. For the average minority
firm, this is perhaps the most difficult section of the
business plan to prepare, but it is also the most important,
as a complete understanding of this facet of its operation
is crucial to the success of any business
As noted earlier, there can be a significant expense
involved in the preparation of a business plan. [Ref. 5»
p. 422] This expense is in terms both of time and money.
Although the SBA provides some assistance, the prime responsi-
bility for the preparation of the plan lies with the
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contractor. Preparation of the business plan is partly a
learning experience and having preparation responsibility
vested with the contractor, insures that he will derive the
maximum educational benefit therefrom.
3 o Risks of Preparati on
The contractor's efforts and the completion of his
plan determine, to a large part, the cost of the plan. This
cost is not without risk, as acceptance into the program
is not dependent upon the submission of the plan, but rather
on the availability of contracts to support the plan. Be-
fore approving the plan, the SBA official must determine
that there is a reasonable likelihood that appropriate sup-
port will be available. [Ref. 36, p 15] The business plan
is reviewed at the district level and if recommended for
approval, is then forwarded to the Regional Office for
approval by the Regional Director*. [Refo 36;, p. 33-37] Even
after approval and acceptance into the program, some risk to
the contractor remains. The SBA clearly states in its letter
of approval to the contractor that its acceptance and approval
of the firm's business plan is not to be considered a commit-
ment on the part of the SBA to award a contract or provide
any form of assistance^, [Ref 36, p. 36]
In the past this has been more than a hypothetical
risk. The GAO findings, based on a three state survey,
revealed that in FY 73, firms in the program received on the
average, little more than half of their projected 3(a) contract
support requirement So [Refo 7, p c 10] The SBA has indicated
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that the primary reason for this failure to provide adequate
support is its 3.ack of control over the other federal agencies
in ensuring that these agencies provide the support needed.
[Ref. 7, p. 16] Albeit, it is noted that for the last three
fiscal years, the agencies have met the support goals estab-
lished by the SBA. Implementation of the SBA's proposed change
to limit the number of contractors in the program and imple-
mentation of the authors'* suggestion to base the award goals
on the actual needs of the contractors, should greatly reduce
the contractors" risk of receiving inadequate support
Although there is some financial risk associated with
the preparation of the business plan, the benefits derived
may well be worth the risks involved whether the contractor
obtains an $(a) contract or noto Sound planning by any
business greatly enhances its chances of success. The typical
small businessman, especially one establishing a new concern,
is generally weak in the financial and marketing areas. The
knowledge gained in preparation of his business plan should
serve as an educational base in these two areas for any future
venture which he may enter e
E. SELECTION OF CONTRACTS
1. Procedures: Theoretical versus Actual
In theory, following approval of a contractor's business
plan, the SBA attempts to fulfill the contractor's needs by re-
questing commitments for procurement contracts from the various
government agencies. For the Department of Defense, the ASPR
clearly states that the SBA shall present its procurement
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support requirements, based on the needs of the contractors
in the program, to the appropriate Department (Navy, Air Force,
DSA, Army). This requirement may be for the support of one
contractor or a larger requirement for the support of several
contractors. Accompanying the request, in accordance with
the ASPR, will be the identification of the SBA's subcontractor( s)
and the capabilities and qualifications of the subcontractor( s)
to accomplish various categories of maintenance, repair, new
construction, etc. The SBA's regulations are silent on this
point, although the CFR implies agreement with this sequence.
This information is provided to the Department's Economic
Utilization Advisor, a position presently held by the Honor-
able Morris Questal (OASN) for the Department of the Navy.
The Department then selects from its future procurement re-
quirements, appropriate contracts to meet this need and offers
them to the SBA.
In actual practice, in the area of Naval shore facili-
ties construction and maintenance, the communication of the
SBA's specific needs to the Navy as described above, does not
occur o Individual contractor requirements are rarely presented
to the Navy's Economic Utilization Advisor or any other office
below him. Although the GAO reported that SBA personnel work
with each agency by reviewing the agency's planned procure-




been very limited contact with the procurement offices
which contract for the construction and maintenance of the
Navy's shore facilities. As a result, the goals and objec-
tives of these offices are not based on the actual needs of
the local SBA District office. Instead, goals are imposed
on them by higher authority. These goals have their origin
in the agreement reached between DOD and the SBA at the Inter-
agency Task Force level. This lack of knowledge of local
SBA needs causes the various procurement offices to select
contracts based on in-house goals, which may be completely
unrelated to the SBA's requirements. The SBA must then
determine from the contracts offered whether it has or can
get a contractor capable of performing the work.
2 . NAVFAC Responsibility versus Authority
The lack of knowledge as to what the SBA actually
needs is not the only factor which creates difficulty in pro-
viding the right contract at the right time. In directing
the Navy to support the program, the Secretary of the Navy
has indirectly given the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC) the responsibility for providing the required support
in the area of construction and maintenance service contracts
because of NAVFAC 's mission in this area. This responsibility
is not accompanied by an equal degree of authority, however,
Specifically, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC) and its" five CONUS Engineering Field Divisions:
Southern Division, NFEC, Atlantic Division, NFEC, Chesapeake




as NAVFAC 's control over expenditures is limited by funding
classifications. Direct control over contract funding by
NAVFAC is confined to Military Construction (MCON) Appropria-
tion funds. Nearly all of the Navy's new construction is
provided in this appropriation. While this accounts for a
significant dollar amount, most of the funds for the past
four years have been expended on large contracts above
$500,000, few of which are small business set asides. A
small amount of construction and nearly all alterations,
repair, and maintenance service contracts are funded by the
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) Appropriation, which
is controlled by other Navy commands and activities. For
the past four fiscal years, in the range most suitable for
award to $(a) firms, i.e., contracts less than $500,000,
two-thirds of the contract awards and one-half of the dollar
volume have been funded by O&MN appropriations (See Appendix
E) • Control over these expenditures by NAVFAC is limited to
certifying the work as to need and technical adequacy. This
certification is performed by the Engineering Field Divisions.
While the activities may be encouraged by the EFD to channel
a portion of their contract awards to $(a) firms, directives
to this effect must come from the activities' headquarters
Based on data obtained from Contract Summary Reports
(NAVDOLK 1B93) prepared by EFD's.
NAVFAC does exercise control over a very small percentage
of these funds for its own facilitieso
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command. Once the activity authorizes the channeling of one
of its O&MN funded projects into the 8(a) program, NAVFAC
must make the award to the SBA as only NAVFAC and its dele-
gated representatives have the authority to award contracts
in the construction and maintenance service area. In the re-
porting of 3(a) awards to the Secretary of the Navy for the
preparation of statistics about the program, NAVFAC is
credited with all awards in this area because of their
authority, even though as noted above, they control only one-
third of these contracts.
3» Factors Affecting Selection
The decision authorizing the use of an O&MN funded
project in the 8(a) program is based on essentially the same
factors as those used by NAVFAC in considering an MCON project
for the program, but these factors affect the decision dif-
ferently for each type of funding. The factors are of three
general classes and may be considered as cost limitations,
time limitations and the complexity of the project. Although
each of the factors will be addressed separately, it is
important to note that they all have their foundation in
the purchasing office's concern over contracting with an in-
experienced contractors This is a liability which the 8(a)
contractor frequently has difficulty in overcoming,.
As previously mentioned in the paper, the 8(a) con-
tractor is restricted in subcontracting with non-disadvantaged
firms, and because of this he may be unable to obtain the
needed management expertise from experienced contractors.
The 8(a) contractor may also look to the SBA to provide
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management counseling but this is seldom an adequate sub-
stitute for knowledgeable management personnel within the
firm itself.
Conversely, the agencies are not always correct in
their assumption that the 8(a) contractor is inexperienced,
as there are some experienced and established contractors in
the 8(a) program. The SBA has, in the past, had a policy of
admitting a limited number of established minority firms in
order that these firms may grow into new and larger areas of
competition. The SBA's philosophy is that these firms have
been unable to make this growth transition because of their
social or economic disadvantage, and the 8(a) program pro-
vides the opportunity for this growtho Although the SBA
needs the larger MCON projects for construction firms in this
category, there apparently has been little publicizing of
their existence, as few NAVFAC procurement personnel are
aware of their presence. Despite the SBA's philosophy, con-
tinuance of these contractors in the program has been questioned
by the GAO, Whether they remain in the program or not, the
limited extent of their participation almost eliminates their
influence in considering the effects of cost limitations,
time limitations, and project complexity on contract selection.
The consideration of cost limitations finds its
basis in the characteristics of the Congressional appropria-
tions which provide the funds for MCON projects and O&MN pro-
jects. Within the MCON appropriation MCON projects are funded
individually. The funds cannot be used for any purpose
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other than the individual project and the use of funds remaining
after award for any other purpose is very restricted. This
restriction provides little incentive to award contracts at
the lowest costo The O&MN appropriation conversely is a
general appropriation , Funding is not directed at any speci-
fic project and savings on any project funded from this appro-
priation may be applied toward any number of other uses.
Although O&MN appropriations have increased over the last
few years, when the appropriations are adjusted to reflect
inflation, the funding level in constant dollars has decreased,
[Ref, 6, p. 29] Aware of this fact and the fact that 8(a)
awards provide little assurance of contract costs lower than
those obtained through competitive bidding, commands seeking
the performance of O&MN funded projects may be understandably
wary of the 8(a) programo
Another factor when considering a project is that of
the time involved in an $(a) award. The type of appropriation
determines the time frame within which the funds must be obli-
gated, i,e
,
a contract awarded. MCON appropriations provide
a two year obligation period, so the MCON project has a
relatively long period of time in which to complete design
work and award a contract,, In contrast to this, projects
funded with O&MN appropriations must be awarded within the
fiscal year appropriated. As all design work must normally
be accomplished within that year, this frequently results
in a relatively short time frame for advertising and awarding
the contract competitively. When the contract is ready to
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be advertised, if it is instead offered to the SBA for the
#(a) program and the SBA is unable to obtain an acceptable
contractor or negotiate an acceptable price, the activity may
not subsequently have sufficient time to advertise and award
the contract competitively. This is not a hypothetical situa-
tion as statistics indicate that well over one-half of all
O&MN projects are awarded in the last three months of the
fiscal year.
The third major factor for consideration is the com-
plexity of the project. The more complex the project, the
greater the desire to ensure that a competent experienced con-
tractor is performing the work. MCON projects are usually of
the new construction type, and are frequently in the upper
end of the under $500,000 range being considered. More impor-
tantly, however, they are usually more complex. The work
often involves the coordination of the efforts of several sub-
contractors, and often requires the use of a considerable
amount of equipment. The concern here is not that the inexperi-
enced contractor may lack the capital to obtain what is needed,
but rather that his inexperience in overall supervision and
coordination, particularly with regard to the proper order
and timing of the various segments of the project, can result
in prohibitively expensive mistakes. Errors can result in
serious losses to the contractor, may cause crucial delays
in the completion of badly needed facilities, and may result
in marginally adequate construction.
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The O&MN funded projects are generally not as complex
as MCON projects. New construction projects in this area
are few in number and ordinarily cost less than $50,000.
Alteration and repair projects, together with maintenance
service contracts are much more numerous and are the source
of almost all the contracts funded by O&MN. The majority
of the alteration and repair contracts typically involve few
trades on any one contract. Painting contracts, re-roofing
contracts, repairs to pavement, and utility repair contracts
are examples of the types of work involved. Maintenance
service contracts such as janitorial contracts and ground
maintenance contracts are typically even less complex and
can be of a large dollar value yet require relatively un-
skilled labor.
All of the above factors may, depending on project
funding, act to restrict the number of contracts deemed suit-
able for consideration for 8(a) award There are other re-
strictions, imposed by the SBA, which do not vary because
of funding but act more uniformly to reduce the number of
those contracts which will be considered. Any contract for
which public solicitation in the form of an Invitation for
Bid, Request for Proposal, or Request for Quotation has al-
ready been issued, may not be considered. Contracts, such
as Architect/Engineer services, which the procuring agency
can award directly to a minority firm without going through
the 8(a) program are not to be considered, nor are contracts
which the procuring agency believes an eligible minority firm
74

to have a reasonable probability of obtaining competitively.
Another factor, previously discussed in the paper, which also
serves to remove contracts from consideration for 8(a) in-
clude the situation where there is a strong possibility that
removing the contract from the competitive scene may cause
an independent business concern to suffer a major hardship.
Also discussed earlier was the removal of contracts in those
instances where the SBA considers the percentage of 8(a)
procurement to be excessive in relation to total procurement
by the government This last factor, however, has had no
impact to date in the area of construction and maintenance
service contracts,
4. SBA Goals as a Factor
In order to properly evaluate the suitability for 8(a)
of any one contract with respect to these factors, there is
one additional factor which is of the utmost significance—
the needs of the SBA, If the SBA has no requirement for
painting contracts, for example, they may be eliminated from
consideration entirely. Construction and services procure-
ment requirements are not met on a national level, as may be
the case in manufacturing procurement requirements where an
East coast minority firm manufactures widgets for a procure-
ment office on the West coast. Requirements for construction
and services invariably must be met by local contractors, and
obviously the reverse is true, namely that the needs of 8(a)
construction and service contractors must be met by federal
agencies in their local area.
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Under the present system, the dollar goals agreed
to by the SI3A and the other Task Force agencies in Washington
D.C. at the beginning of each fiscal year become the driving
force behind each of the agencies' efforts. In establishing
these goals, however, the agreement matches only gross SBA
needs and gross agency requirements o There is no attempt to
determine whether ultimately the SBA and the agency will be
able to match needs and requirements at the local level. For
example, at the top, the SBA and DOD can agree that the former
has a need for painting contracts and the latter has a require-
ment for painting. But if the SBA's painting contractors are
not in areas where the DOD activities with the painting require-
ments are located, the two cannot be matched.
As previously discussed, the agreement by DOD at
the Task Force level becomes the goal for DOD and is distributed
among the services. In turn, within the services, the respec-
tive Secretaries set goals for the lower echelons based on the
goals directed by DOD, This is no attempt to set goals for
the various commands based on the SBA's contractor's needs in
the local area of each commando The result of this failure
to communicate in planning is that the goals set for any one
procurement office are in no way related to the needs of the
local SBA office, nor does the SBA relate its contractors'
business plan projections to the requirements of the local
procurement offices. Neither the system which is prescribed
in the various applicable regulations, nor the system that
actually exists, does much in the way of matching these
76

requirements. The regulations require that the SBA present
its requirements to the Economic Utilization Advisor for the
Secretary of the Navy, who will then attempt to locate suit-
able contracts to meet these requirements. In actual practice,
a local procurement office will select an appropriate con-
tract (s) in order to meet its goal, offer it to the local
SBA office, and then wait to see if the SBA has or can locate
a contractor who can do the work and needs the work.
This lack of communication frequently results in the
SBA being unable to obtain the contracts it needs. The SBA
has indicated that this is the reason for its chronic under-
support of contractors and stated that it must get more con-
trol over agency requirements before the problem can be resolved.
It is noted, though that the agencies have consistently met
or exceeded the SBA's goals for contract support, so it appears
that the problem might better be resolved by having goals more
consistent with the contractors' needs and then ensuring that
the goals are meto The first part of this solution appears
to be underway with the SBA's indication that goals in the
future will be developed from the District level up, based on
actual contractor projected needs as outlined in the business
plans,
5. The Local Task Force Concept
For the second part of the solution, it is necessary
that each procuring office establish its goals based on the
needs and goals of its corresponding local SBA office. These
procurement office goals can then be generated upward to the
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DOD and Task Force level where they should correspond with
the SBA's goals. At the Task Force level, goals would be
perfunctorily agreed to by the SBA and the agencies and for-
malized by a redistribution back down the SBA and DOD command
chains to the appropriate level. In order to meet established
goals, SBA regional and district offices would then work with
the procurement offices throughout the year to match individual
contractors with individual requirements.
For the system to properly function, communication
between the SBA and the agencies at the local level must be
considerably improvedo One method for this would be to have
each SBA regional office meet at the beginning of each fiscal
year with regional representatives of each of the federal
agencies from which the SBA receives contracts. With the
regions being far less in number than the districts (10 against
Si), the regional level would be the optimal point in the
infrastructure, since planning conferences would require far
less manhours, yet still be able to correlate detailed infor-
mation. The Engineering Field Divisions of the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command would serve as Navy's regional represen-
tatives for construction and maintenance contracts.
This meeting between SBA Regional officials and
representatives from other federal agencies would be similar
to the present Interagency Task Force meeting in Washington
and could be considered a Local Task Force, A matching of
SBA needs and agency requirements would be accomplished for
the forthcoming fiscal year. Presented with the SBA
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detailed requirements by total dollar value, contract types,
and specific local needs, the agencies could easily correlate
this with their own requirements.
The agreement reached at this Local Task Force meeting
would not link specific projects to the SBA's requirement,
but would only recognize the existence of adequate agency re-
quirements for the right type and amount of contracts in the
right area. For example, assume the SBA needed $700,000 in
painting contracts for the San Diego area If the Navy his-
torically has awarded $6 million in painting contracts in that
area, the Engineering Field Division representative might
agree to provide $300,000 of the SBA's needs, with other agencies
providing the rest. Then during the fiscal year the EFD would
have to ensure that at least $300,000 of all the painting con-
tracts awarded that year were awarded to the SBA.
In implementing the system described above, there is
one weakness which must be bridged to ensure success. As the
Navy's representative at the regional meeting, the Engineering
Field Division will be speaking not only for the contracts
over which it has authority, but also for those contracts con-
trolled by the individual activities in its area of cognizance.
As discussed previously, the activities have authority over
the majority of the contracts considered suitable for 8(a)
award. Control by EFD is limited to certifying the need for
the work to be done under any one of the contracts. Two
questions then arise—one, how can the EFD's knowledgeably
represent and make commitments for the activities; and two,
79

what can be done to ensure that the activities will fulfill
the commitments made by the EFD's?
In response to the first question, the EFD can rely-
on historical data, A review of Appendix E shows that, his-
torically, the dollar amount of the annual contract awards
in the range suitable for 8(a) has remained relatively con-
stant. This applies for both the EFD controlled awards and
activity controlled awards o In addition to this historical
data, the EFD usually has a reasonably accurate picture of
an activity's forecasted contract workload because of the
concept mentioned earlier of the EFD having to approve all
construction and repair-type work for need and technical
adequacy The sum total of this knowledge would make the
EFD fully able to confer with the SBA and make realistic
commitments representing the activities.
The second problem, that of ensuring that the activi-
ties fulfill the commitments made by the EFD is the heart of
the weakness in the system. By directing greater attention
to the major procurement activities than the individual shore
activities in establishing the Navy's goals for the 8(a) pro-
gram, the ASN(l&L) has overlooked a significant area of
contracting capacity. Although they may be aware of the 8(a)
program, without direct encouragement to support the program,
the majority of the shore activities have, to date, directed
their attention to other problems and priorities© Greater
support for and participation in the 8(a) program could be
obtained from these activities if official directives were
80

issued by ASN(l&L) to the activities encouraging them to sup-
port the 3(a) program. Concurrently, the EFD's should provide
the activities with a clear explanation of the program and
an indication of the extent of its impact on their procurement
process.
It is the authors' judgement that the above described
system is the most logical and practical method for ensuring
that the SBA's needs are fulfilled It is therefore strongly
recommended that such a system be implemented.
F. CONTRACTOR SELECTION AND NEGOTIATION
1 • Selection of a Contractor
Following the receipt of an agency's requirement, the
SBA must then select a contractor to perform the work. It
is the policy of the SBA to select this contractor based on
limited competition to the extent feasible and practicable.
In selecting a contractor, the SBA will consider the needs
of the contractor for the size and type of contract, the
ability of the contractor to perform the work, and the
assistance which the contract will provide the firm in be-
coming competitive. Price, however, will not be a factor in
such competition. [Ref. 36, p. 17] As previously mentioned
in the section of the thesis pertaining to the legal ramifi-
cations surrounding the 8(a) program, this method has been
challenged as being tantamount to sole-source selection, but
the courts have upheld the SBA's position. Because of the
controversial nature of this particular SBA procedure, it is
recommended that the SBA take steps to make this procedure
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more formal. Even if the procedure was concluded with only
a simple memorandum to file, it would serve as documentation
to refute later allegations of the type mentioned above.
After selecting the contractor, the SBA Regional Office
then submits a letter to OASN(l&L) containing all the perti-
nent information. This information includes the name of the
contractor, the proposed contract, certification of the con-
tractor's requirement for federal assistance, the contractor's
qualifications, and lastly, that this contract be reserved
for S(a) procurement. If this request is approved, the SBA
is so notified, and the Navy procurement office is authorized
to proceed with negotiation.
2. Negotiation and BDE
There are two contracts and theoretically, two nego-
tiations involved. The first contract is between the SBA
and the procuring agency, and the second between the SBA and
the subcontractor. In approaching these two contracts it is
the SBA's policy to enter into a contract with another govern-
ment agency at a price which is fair, reasonable, and com-
patible with $(a) program objectives, and then to negotiate
a subcontract with a minority contractor which is also fair
and reasonable.
The SBA does not prepare its own cost estimate for
the negotiation with the contractor, but instead, relies on
an estimate prepared by the procuring agency, in this case
the Navy. Along with this estimate, the SBA receives a com-
plete set of plans and specifications pertaining to the
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proposed contract. At this time, the SBA is also instructed
by the Navy procurement office not to divulge the estimate
to the prospective contractor.
For negotiation of construction contracts, the govern-
ment estimate is used as the "current fair market value,"
If it is determined during the negotiation that an amount
over and above the "fair market value" is necessary to insure
profitability to the contractor, the SBA may fund this dif-
ferential, known as Business Development Expense (BDE) 9 from
funds appropriated for this purpose. The ASPR position re-
garding BDE states • • • any costs which are in excess of
the estimated current fair market price anticipated under
normal procurement procedures shall be funded by the SBA e "
In the past, the SBA's policy was not to fund BDE on con-
struction contracts except in unusual circumstances, A
reflection of this policy can be seen in Table 3, page &l+ e
The underlying philosophy behind this policy is that each
construction contract is unique and therefore any cost esti-
mate is, at best, subjective. Unlike manufacturing contracts,
where costs can be estimated quite precisely, construction
contracts are subject to many variables, some of which are
unknown at the time an estimate is made. Weather and dif-
fering site conditions are examples of these variables
o
In its most recent SOP, the SBA changed this policy
and now allows BDE on construction projects at the discretion
of the Regional and District offices The local SBA officers
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regional official stated that he has used BDE on selected
construction contracts since the change in policy, while
another still expressed opposition to providing BDE for any
construction contracts.
While the procuring agencies conceded that government
estimates in the area of construction may vary to a signifi-
cant degree from actual cost, they also indicated that a
policy of not using BDE for any construction contracts was
unduly restrictive This restriction prevents the award of
any contract where the procuring agency and the 8(a) con-
tractor fail to agree on contract price. Navy activities are
bound by the ASPR to pay no more than the current fair market
value. This value is based on the government estimate which
may be revised where in error, but still represents the upper
limit for the agency in the negotiation. The procuring
agencies indicated a belief that in many instances sufficient
data was available for the estimate to be in close agreement
with the actual costs They felt thai, for these contracts,
in instances where the 8(a) contractor is unable to meet that
price, refusal by the SBA to even consider BDE results in the
time spent in negotiation being lost and procuring agency re-
sources being wasted.
The authors, however, believe that a more basic ques-
tion about BDE exists than whether more BDE funds should be
spent on construction contracts. The authors question the
SBA's use of BDE to fund the difference between the fair mar-
ket value and the 8(a) contractor's price o With the BDE
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expended in the form of* a direct grant for a particular con-
tract, it appears that the 8(a) contractor will have little
incentive to develop meaningful price proposals if he believes
that the difference between his proposal and the government
estimate will be funded by BDE.
Under the present system, the contractor's ability
to receive the BDE assistance is tied directly to the contract.
If the contractor isn't awarded the contract, he doesn't re-
ceive the BDE funds. The purposes for which BDE can be util-
ized, however, according to the SBA's directives, are not
necessarily tied to any specific contract. The SBA states
that BDE may be granted:
**
o • • where additional financial capacity is needed
to overcome firm deficiencies to produce a product
at a competitive unit cost, BDE may include, but is
not limited to:
1. Capital equipment,
2. Facility and production engineering,
3. Special tooling and test equipment,
4. Development and implementation of quality
control procedures,
5. Training costs—low labor productivity due
to inexperience,
6. Labor costs,
7o Material wastage costs,
8. General and administrative expenses.
9. Differential due to low order purchasing
power and/or material usage in comparison
to it s c omp et it ors
•
10. Interest expense to be borne by the 8(a)
concern in connection with contract performance.
[Ref. 36, p. 87]
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The authors believe that these requirements may be satisfied
through low interest loans and lines of credit v/hich could
be made available to the 8(a) contractor by or through the SBA.
For example, the SBA could guarantee loans or lines of credit
made by commercial lending institutions, thereby removing
the high risk usually associated with a struggling firm.
BDE funds would then be used to reimburse the creditors for
those loans which are not repaid, rather than for direct
grants to the 8(a) contractor. As the goal would be to reduce
the lending institution's risk on an 8(a) contractor loan to
that comparable of a non-minority contractor, and not to re-
move all risk, the SBA loan guarantee could be for less than
lOO^o The figure used would be based on the degree of risk
to the lender. The use of loans and lines of credit would
satisfy the contractor's deficiencies, and yet still provide
adequate incentive to develop meaningful cost proposals.
The loan need not be associated with an}?" particular contract
but rather be based on the contractor's overall needs. The
authors therefore recommend that the SBA discontinue its
present policy of utilizing BDE funds to provide direct grants
to contractors, and institute a loan program using BDE funds
either directly for the loans or as a guarantee for commercial
lenders.
3. Negotiator Conflict of Interest
Although in theory the SBA receives a procurement
request, selects a contractor, negotiates with this contractor,
and then negotiates with the agency, the actual practice
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varied by locality and by agency within a locality. Some
SBA offices followed this theoretical procedure and others
followed a policy of allowing agencies with sound estimates
to establish a price which the $(a) contractor must meet,
with or without BDE, or there is no contract. Other SBA
offices arranged for SBA, contractor, and agency personnel
to all be present at one negotiation with the procuring agency
conducting negotiations directly with the contractor, and
the SBA acting as an observer. There were even instances
where agency procurement negotiators dealt directly with the
contractor in the absence of any SBA representatives.
These last two variations resulted primarily from
the SBA's apparent inability to handle negotiations in the
early years of the program due to a lack of qualified person-
nel. Regional and district SBA representatives indicated
that qualified construction negotiators were being hired and
the practice of having agency personnel negotiate directly
with the contractor may be discontinued. Procedures more
closely aligned to the theoretical procedure would be followed
with the SBA negotiator responsible for obtaining a price
which is fair and reasonable to both the minority contractor
and the government, and in consonance with 8(a) objectives.
As mentioned earlier, the SBA negotiator would attempt to
arrive at this price by reviewing both the government's esti-
mate and the contractor's estimate for accuracy and validity.
The SBA negotiator would act as the man in the middle, negoti-
ating separately with both the contractor and the government.
SS

This procedure appears contrary to normal procure-
ment practice. Under normal procurement procedures, the
agency acquisition negotiator receives a cost estimate in
the form of a proposal from the contractor which he reviews
prior to entering actual negotiation. During negotiation,
it is the role of the government negotiator to obtain the
best possible contract package for the government, while the
contractor simultaneously protects his own interests. This
is not the situation that exists in the typical 8(a) negoti-
ation. The contractor (the SBA) does not prepare his own
proposal, but rather is provided with a cost estimate by
the procuring office. The SBA negotiator not only uses
this as a basis to negotiate a fair and reasonable price
with the 8(a) contractor, but also uses this estimate to
negotiate with the agency that prepared it. The SBA is thus
required to represent the interests of the 8(a) contractor
in the negotiations between the SBA and the agency, and repre-
sent the government in the negotiations between the contractor
and the SBA. This results in a conflict of interests, which
in the authors' judgement, will result in favor of the con-
tractor as the SBA's primary objective in the 8(a) program
is to produce viable minority firms. To truly look after the
interests of the minority contractor, it is doubtful that
the SBA negotiator will also seek to obtain the best price
for the government e
The authors, therefore, propose that the SBA not be
permitted to see the government estimate. It is further
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proposed that the SBA no longer act as a negotiator between
both the £(a) contractor and the procuring agency, but in-
stead act only in an advisory capacity to the B(a) contractor
The subcontractor could be assisted by SBA personnel in
preparing a price proposal based solely on the plans and
specifications. Negotiations would be conducted with SBA,
subcontractor, and procuring agency personnel all present,
but with the actual negotiation being primarily between the
procuring agency and the subcontractor. The presence of
the SBA in the negotiation would serve to preserve the
legality of the contract between the SBA and the procuring
agency. In the event that the contractor's proposal is
significantly below the government estimate, the government
estimate should be re-evaluated for its validity and if deemed
accurate, the contractor should be made aware that his pro-
posal is considered suspect in a particular area, e.g., the
amount of labor required for the job,. It is believed that
the proposal whereby the SBA acts as an advisor to the sub-
contractor in negotiations will benefit both the contractor,
in that valuable on-the-job experience will be gained, and
also the procuring agency since there will be a greater
guarantee that a fair price will result
Concurrent with the implementation of this change,
it is further recommended that changes be made to the present
policy within the Navy concerning approval of contracts to
be awarded to the SBA. In addition to requesting approval
to negotiate from OASN(I&L) after the SBA has selected a
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contractor, OASN(I&L) must again be notified to obtain
approval to award after negotiations are complete. The
Engineering Field Divisions of NAVFAC have the engineering
competence and contracting experience to grant approval at
their level. Approval at this level would reduce the paper-
work involved in the administration of the program and pro-
vide a reduction in the time required to negotiate and award,
a factor which can frequently be critical. It is therefore
recommended that the ASPR be amended to provide the EFD's
(and pertinent other procurement offices) authority to award




Upon receipt of approval from OASN(l&L) to award the
contract, the procuring office prepares two contracts for
signature. The first contract is a prime contract between
the Navy and the SBA, and the second is a subcontract between
the SBA and the 3(a) contractor. The administration of
these contracts is controlled by the provisions in the con-
tracts and since the two contracts have different provisions,
each can affect the administration differently. Understanding
the differences between these two contracts is necessary to
understand the problems which may develop in the administra-




The prime contract between the SBA and the Navy is
prepared on the standard contract form, but incorporates no
general provisions as they are not operative between two
agencies of the government. The prime contract recognizes,
however, that the subcontract does contain general provisions,
and delegates the procuring agency to administer the sub-
contract between the SBA and the 3(a) contractor [Ref. 36,
p. 1$] In the administration of the subcontract, the pro-
curing agency has authority to invoke all but eight of the
clauses in the general provisions, [Ref, 1, p, 1:127] These
eight clauses can only be invoked by the SBA in appropriate
cases when requested by the DOD contracting officer. If the
SBA does not agree with the DOD contracting officer'"s request,
the case is referred for decision to the Secretary of the










[Ref. 1, p. 1:127]
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The subcontract between the SBA and the 8(a) con-
tractor is prepared on standard contract forms. In recogni-
tion of the fact that the 8(a) contractor is a subcontractor,
and to protect the interests of the procuring agency, an
amendment to the "Disputes" clause is incorporated in the
subcontract. [Ref. 1, p. 1:126] The amendment specifies
that the "duly authorized representative" in the "Disputes"
clause refers to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA). The result of this amendment is that disputes between
the subcontractor and the Navy administrator are referred
to the ASBCA rather than being settled by the SBA.
Procedurally, the contract between the agency and
the SBA is signed first. This avoids the situation where
the 8(a) contractor has a contract to perform the work, but
the SBA has no contract with an agency requiring the work
and providing funds for the work*
2. Routine Administration
In the day-to-day administration, the 8(a) contract
does not differ significantly from other contracts. The SBA
is required to maintain contact with the subcontractor and
a copy of all correspondence of any consequence from the
administrator to the subcontractor is provided the SBA. Any
action which requires a change to the prime contract will
generally necessitate a corresponding action to the subcontract,
Payments to the 8(a) contractor are effected directly
between the contractor and the administering procurement
office o In those instances where the SBA has agreed to pay
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BDE, these funds are furnished to the procuring agency by the
SBA where they are expended during the progress of the con-
tract and incorporated into the payments to the contractor.
[Ref. 36, p. S9]
3. SBA Responsibility
The contractual arrangement in 8(a) contracting is
a unique experience for the administrator. Having awarded
a contract to the SBA for the performance of some service or
provision of some product, he is then appointed by his own
contractor to administer the subcontract, and told by his
own contractor (the SBA) that he (the administrator) cannot
take any action affecting certain terms of the contract
without the agreement of the contractor (the SBA) • While in
actuality the situation is not as confusing as that descrip-
tion might suggest, all of the questions regarding the arrange-
ment have not been answered from the viewpoint of contract
law.
In the area of the Navy's construction and maintenance
contracts, there have been relatively few instances where the
need arose to invoke any of the restricted clauses o In those
instances that have arisen to date, the problems have been
resolved at the SBA-NAVFAC level.
What has not been resolved to date is the responsibility
of the SBA* The SBA has a responsibility to the Navy to pro-
vide the required product or service. Under normal contract
procedures, the Navy may recover damages from the contractor
for failure to meet his contract. Because of the inability
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of one branch of the government to file suit against another,
the Navy has no such recourse against the SBA, If the 8(a)
contractor fails to perform, the SBA attempts to locate
another 8(a) contractor to perform the work. If another con-
tractor cannot be found, the procuring agency is requested
to recall the procurement, and arrangements made to terminate
the contract without cost to either party. [Ref. 36, p Q 80]
The authors question this concept of whether a contract can
be terminated without cost to either party The question also
arises as to the extent of the SBA's responsibility for the
failure of the 8(a) contractor. As the primary source of
management counsel and assistance, it appears that a certain
amount of responsibility would accrue to the SBAo The authors
believe that there remains room for considerable clarifica-
tion in the legal aspects of the dual contract arrangement,
H. CONTRACTOR GRADUATION OR TERMINATION
The SBA's recent attention to the development of goals
utilizing graduates as a measurement of the success of the
8(a) program focused attention on another problem—how to
determine when a contractor was ready to graduate? Concur-
rently, the SBA directives to the district offices to terminate
those contractors failing to make progress focused attention
on the problem of determining when a contractor should be
terminatedo Discussions with SBA personnel indicated that
prior to the issuance of the current SOP 60 41 1 in November
1974, there was only limited guidance available on how to
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make these determinations. This new SOP provided more
specific guidance in these two areas by listing several
criteria for each action which should be considered in
determining whether a contractor should be graduated or
terminated.
In considering whether a firm is ready for graduation,
SOP 60 40 1 states that generally a firm has met the criteria
for completing the program when it has achieved the objec-
tives of its approved business plan. In addition, twelve
other criteria were listed which should be taken into con-
sideration in determining whether the firm has completed
the program. These criteria include such data as net profit
earned each year, current financial indicators, progress in
competitive bidding, attraction of new equity, etc. [Ref.
36, p 83-34]
Separate criteria were provided for determining whether
a firm should be terminated from the program by withdrawing
the support being provided by the SBA. Totaling nine in
number, these criteria specify that termination may result
for various reasons including business failure of the firm,
changes in ownership or management without approval by the
SBA, failure to operate in an ethical manner, failure to pro-
vide the SBA with quarterly financial data, etc [Ref. 36,
p. Si]
Although neither of these lists of criteria are completely
objective since absolute values are not provided for the
regional and district SBA offices (e. g., requiring a current
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ratio of 1 to 1) , they do provide firm guidance to the local
SBA offices as to what factors should be considered. Thus,
a degree of flexibility is allowed the local SBA office in
determining exact graduation or termination criteria This
flexibility is required because specific values for these
criteria vary by industry, firm, and specific situation. It
would be extremely difficult for exact criteria to be estab-
lished at the Washington level to account for the many variables
which affect the termination or final graduation of each
specific contractor* The authors believe a better approach
is to require that the regional and district SBA offices estab-
lish and document specific values for the termination or
graduation criteria of each contractor as he is admitted to
the program Adjustments to these values can be made as re-
quired as the contractor progresses through the program.
Concerning graduation, although industry ratios can be
used as guides, the final judgement on the validity of the
exact criteria established by the local SBA office cannot be
made until it can be determined how many firms of similar
characteristics were successful based on these criteria. By
keeping data on the firms who have graduated from the program,
the SBA can eventually develop a set of successful criteria
for guidelines in setting exact criteria for future firms.
The authors therefore recommend that the SBA require that
its regional and district offices establish and document
specific criteria for termination and graduation from the 3(a)
program for each contractor as that contractor is admitted to
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the program. In addition, and in consonance with a previous
recommendation of monitoring the progress of firms after
graduation, it is suggested that records of those firms who
have completed the program be closely scrutinized to further
assist in establishing legitimate graduation criteria for
future 8(a) firms,
IV. AGENCY PARTICIPATION AND FACTORS INVOLVED
In the past, attempts to measure support for the 8(a)
program by the Navy, NAVFAC, and the EFD's have been limited
to comparing total dollar volumes attained in 8(a) awards.
These have been compared at the various levels, such as
between the Army, Navy, and Air Force and within the Navy
between the various procurement commands o The comparisons
have been of two types—comparing the absolute dollar volumes
attained by various agencies, and comparing the success of
each agency in attaining goals set for it. Neither of these
comparisons, however, gave any recognition to certain factors
influencing the amount of support which the agencies can pro-
vide the program. These factors include the following:
1. Differences between the services in the amount of
funds they have to expend in supporting the 8(a) program.
2 Variations in the geographical distribution of
numbers of 8(a) contractors, types of contractors, pro-
curement offices, and types of procurement requirements.
3. Annual variations in the geographical distributions.
4» Nonuniformity in SBA support.
This chapter discusses the impact of these factors en the
support provided to the 8(a) program by the various agencies
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and presents a system which the authors believe account for
them in a relatively simple fashion*
A. SIZE DIFFERENCES
A significant factor affecting the degree to which an
agency can support the 8(a) program is its total amount of
procurement that is suitable to meet the needs of the 8(a)
contractors. This differs considerably between the Services
and between procuring offices within a Service, making straight
dollar comparisons unfair to those with lesser amounts of
total requirements suitable for the program. For example, if
the Army has procurement requirements twice as large as the
Air Force, it appears illogical to require the Air Force to
attain the same dollar level as the Army in order to demon-
strate an equal degree of support for the program.
In order to make a comparison, it therefore is necessary
to find a measure which eliminates any size differences
between the various departments. This applies for comparisons
both at the DOD level and within the Navy. One method is to
contrast the contracts actually awarded under 8(a) with the
total requirements which could theoretically be awarded
through the program. Expressed as a percentage, this ratio
would measure an agency's performance against its own potential
These percentages could then be compared between agencies.
Choosing this approach, the authors were then faced with the
problem of calculating the potential agency procurement needs
that could be satisfied by an 8(a) contractor, as the actual
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awards were readily available from agency records, but potential
agency requirements were not.
In reviewing existing data to determine some measure of
potential 8(a) requirements, such a measure was found in the
form of small business "set-asides," Set-asides are competi-
tively bid contracts which are restricted by the procuring
agency for accomplishment by small business, on the premise
that small business is capable of performing the work. Since
all 8(a) contractors are small businessmen, it is reasonable
to assume that set-asides are a rough measure of potential
work for them. Most set-asides are required by law but others
are set aside at the agency's discretion Although small
businesses do in certain cases successfully bid for non-set-
aside contracts, they win these contracts away from big
business solely on the basis of competition with big business*
Thus, only set-asides represent a sure potential for the 8(a)
program, as there is a requirement that they go to a small
business firm. The authors therefore reasoned that the total
amount of set-aside contracts constituted the potential for
8(a) awardso These annual totals were used with the total
annual 8(a) awards to obtain the figures shown in Appendix F,
for DOD as a whole, for each of the Departments within DOD
and for NAVFAC. The annual total amounts of 8(a) awards, for
each service, DOD, and NAVFAC expressed as a percentage of
the total set-asides are illustrated in Figure 4. Similar
data was compiled for the Engineering Field Divisions of the
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calculations are contained in Appendix G with percentages
displayed graphically in Figure 5. The impact of NAVFAG on
the Navy's performance is significant. During the past four
fiscal years, construction and maintenance Set Asides have
accounted for an average of 55$ of the Navy's total dollar
volume of Set Asides. As indicated in Appendix F, this con-
tribution amounted to $243 million of the Navy total of $427
million in FY 1974o In addition, the number of contracts
awarded by the agency should also be considered since the
SBA may need greater numbers of contracts in one region vice
another. Larger numbers of contracts, as a general rule,
require more time and effort to administer even though their
total aggregate dollar value may be less than a smaller number
of contracts. Although Figures 4 and 5 portray varying levels
of support by the different agencies, a true measure of each
agency's support must also consider the impact of the other
factors influencing this support as delineated earlier in this
chapter.
Bo GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION
To successfully consumate the award of an B(a) contract,
it is necessary to match the contractor's service or product
with the proper type of procurement requirement, i.e., a
painting contractor needs painting worko In predicting whether
such a match can be accomplished by a procurement office of
a particular agency at any given point in time, there are
essentially five factors for which variations in geographic
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1« The types of contractors
2. The numbers of contractors
3. The requirements of the procurement offices
4. The agency procurement offices
5» Other federal agencies
The geographic distribution of the types of contractors
must be considered because, of the three general types, i c e,,
supply, construction, and service, the last two must have
their needs met within the same local area. This requirement
to match construction and service contractor needs with pro-
curement requirements within the same local area exists be-
cause these contractors must locate the majority of their
equipment and personnel on the work site or near it. The
mix of contractor types, however, varies by location* One
area may contain twice as many painting contractors as roofing
contractors while in another locality the situation may be
reversed, or more significantly, may have neither one. Although
Table 3 does not break out contractor types into sufficient
detail to accurately match the contractor's type of service
or product with the corresponding type of procurement require-
ment, it does show that there exists disparities in the mix
even between these general categories*
The variation in contractor type relates directly with
the variation in the requirements of the procurement office,
A mismatch in the requirements of a local procuring office
and the types of work performed by the available £(a) con-
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agency can provide the 8(a) program in the area of construc-
tion and service contractso
The ability to match a contractor's needs with procurement
requirements is affected not only by variations in the type
of contracts, but also by the number of contractors in the
area. This varies considerably nationally. Table 4 shows the
distribution of all 8(a) contractors by SBA region with a
-1 r\c

*breakout of construction and maintenance service contractors.
As the geographic distribution of an agency's local procure-
ment offices also varies, an agency may or may not be located
in areas where there are enough $(a) contractors for the agency
to make a contribution to the 3(a) program comparable to another
agency. An example of these variations is provided by the
Navy which is primarily located on or near the two coasts,
while the Army has significant concentrations in the interior
states.
Not only must the geographic distribution of an agency's
own offices be accounted for in determining the proper level
of support which an agency should provide the 6(a) program,
the effect of the geographic distribution of the local
procurement offices of other agencies must be recognized.
This effect can best be illustrated by an example. A DOD
activity of moderate size in Nevada may be the only federal
procurement office in a very large geographical area and be
required to provide all the support for 6(a) construction
and maintenance contractors in the area. Conversely, an
activity of similar size in central Georgia may not have to
provide any support because of a preponderance of other
federal procurement offices in that area.
Thus, the national geographic distribution of minority
contractors, the type of work they perform, the national
The primary interest of this thesis is in the area of con-
struction and maintenance for Navy shore facilities, therefore
maintenance service contractors (Janitorial, ground maintenance,
etCo) were separated from the remaining service contractors
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Region I Region VI
Maine 2 3 Texas 72 125
New Hampshire 1 1 Louisiana 35 46
Vermont 1 2 Arkansas 11 14
Massachusetts 44 95 New Mexico 26 43





Region II Iowa 19 22
New York 68 156 Missouri 46 75
New Jersey- 18 37 Nebraska 11 16
H55" W5 Kansas 22 36
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Region III
Pennsylvania 41 71 Region VIII
Delaware 4 4 North Dakota 4 5
Maryland 25 72 South Dakota 6 7
Washington, D.C. 63 181 Montana 2 6
Virginia 50 102 Wyoming 3 3
West Virginia 7 8 Utah 5 8
T90~ Colorado 29 63
49 92
Region IV
North Carolina 14 31 Region IX
South Carolina 10 13 Arizona 17 24
Georgia 19 34 Nevada 7 7
Florida 28 44 California 130 290
Alabama 16 28 154 321
Mississippi 8 12
Tennessee 19 26 Region X





Oregon 11 21Region V CDAlaska 16 18









Includes only construction and maintenance service
contractors.
Source: Small Business Administration, Firms in the 8(a) Busi'
ness Development Program, Washington, GPO, October
1974. (Calculations and chart by authors)
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geographic distribution of an agency's local procuring offices
as well as the mix in types of procurement requirements at
these local procurement offices, all interrelate and play a
large role in determining the level of support which an agency
can provide to the B(a) program.
C. ANNUAL VARIATIONS
Any effort to analyze and determine the variables noted
in the preceding section in order to quantify them for future
prediction must also consider that any or all of them will
change. The annual changes in the three general types of sup-
ply, services, and construction contracts over the last four
fiscal years is shown in Figure 6 C These annual variations
are caused by factors including changes in the SBA's portfolio
of contractors and modifications in the business plan projec-
tions of those in the program as a result of their progress
through the program* Changes of this type result in alteration
to both the types of contractor requirements at the local
level and the contractor density distribution on the national
level. The SBA's present proposal to reduce the number of
contractors in the program to 1260 will also undoubtably cause
further variations in contractor distribution
Mixes in local procurement office requirements will vary
according to the evolving needs of the agencies which they sup-
port. The opening of new bases and closure of existing ones
will readjust the national geographic distribution of that
service's procuring offices Base openings can also reduce
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contribute, just as closures can increase the share of those
agencies remaining in the area. Regardless of the reason
geographic distributions do not remain constant, but rather,
are constantly shifting in response to changing conditions.
D. NONUNIFORMITY OF SBA SUPPORT
The fourth factor to be considered is the most difficult
to quantify, but has an influence on the support which an
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agency provides the program as great as that of any of the
other factors. By being the determining factor in whether
a contractor gets into the program, the SBA controls the upper
limit on which a procuring office can support the program.
This factor is thus intertwined with the previous two factors
in that the SBA can limit the entry of contractors into the
program.
The authors do not mean to imply that SBA personnel are
opposed to the program or have any biases or prejudices against
certain contractors. What is recognized is that the SBA
has limited resources in terms of both funds and personnel,
although the aggressiveness and enthusiasm of the personnel
can frequently increase the extent to which these resources
can be stretched. Nevertheless, once an SBA office has
reached its limit, in terms of the number of contractors it
can adequately support, the needs of these contractors estab-
lish the limits on how much support a procuring office can
provide the program, not a goal established for the procuring
office by higher authority.
E. A METHOD FOR EVALUATION OF AGENCY SUPPORT
The effects of all the factors previously discussed in
this chapter must be considered in attempting an accurate
evaluation of any agency's performance in supporting the 8(a)
program. One method for evaluating agency support, is to
establish a reasonable goal as a benchmark upon which the
actual support provided can be compared. For DOD and the
Navy, in the past this goal was established using a "top
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down approach," i.e., computing the goal at the headquarters
or higher authority level, subdividing this figure, and dis-
tributing to each local procurement office their share of the
total goal. Use of this approach requires development of a
formula or system to account for the size, geographic dis-
tributions, and most importantly, their interrelationships,
if it is to be meaningful. In the authors' opinion, develop-
ment of such a system would be extremely complex, cumbersome,
and of questionable accuracy,
A system which the authors believe would satisfactorily
account for the effects of size, geographic distribution, and
other factors in attainment of goals is that described as the
"Local Task Force Concept" discussed earlier in this thesis.
By establishing goals from the "bottom up," all of the variables
related to these factors would automatically be accounted for
when the Regional SBA office and the regional agency repre-
sentatives agreed on mutual goals which would recognize the
limitations of each of the parties to the agreement.
Based on the projected number of contractors they intend
to support in their area, Regional SBA officials are in the
best position to estimate the contractors' needs, by type and
location within the region, for the upcoming year. For the
Navy's shore facilities construction and maintenance program,
the EFD's are in the best, position Jto forecast their projected
procurement requirements, also by type and geographic location.
At the local task force meeting, the SBA and the agencies can
match contractor needs with agency requirements and agree as
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to how much 8(a) support each agency will provide. The agency's
goals will be generated from this meeting and will be in con-
sonance with SBA needs . Measurement of agency support can
then be based on how well the agency meets these goals. For
example, the support actually provided expressed as a percentage
of the established goal would be an adequate relative measure
of support.
This system does, however, have one major weakness, in
that, agencies who do not enthusiastically support the 8(a)
program may leave the local task force meeting with a goal
based on a disproportionately lower share of the projected
contractor needs. To ascertain if established goals represent
an equitable distribution of 8(a) procurements among agencies,
the amount of 8(a) awards expressed as a percentage of the
agencies 'potential 8(a) requirements could be monitored and
corrective action taken as necessary. As discussed earlier
in this chapter, this measurement also tends to mitigate size
differences between agencies.
The authors recommend that the "Local Task Force" concept
be used together with the measurement discussed in the preceeding
paragraph to monitor and evaluate agency support to the 8(a)
program. In addition, the authors recommend that responsibility
for the 8(a) program at the local procurement office level
be placed with the Small Business Specialist attached to the
procuring office, in order to separate as much as possible
the responsibility for meeting the procurement requirements
of the agency from the responsibility for ensuring that the
8(a) program is supported.
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V . RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In reviewing the efficiency of the SBA's administration
of the 8(a) program, and in particular as it relates to the
Navy and NAVFAC , several deficiencies which led to ineffi-
ciencies in operation were noted and recommendations for im-
provement were presented in previous chapters. Implementation
of these recommendations should considerably improve the
existing 8(a) program and eliminate many of the conflicts in
its present operation. There are, however, two basic weak-
nesses which are inherent to the program and seriously limit
its success. These weaknesses cannot be corrected as long
as the 8(a) authority is used. The first weakness is the con-
flict between the basic philosophy of the procurement offices
which use formal advertising to obtain the lowest reasonable
price for the government, and the philosophy of the 8(a)
program which uses a negotiated process in which price is
not a dominant factor. The second weakness results from the
lack of control the SBA has over the supply of contracts,
which in turn prevents the SBA from being able to ensure
that its contractors receive the contracts they need.
The following alternative to using the 8(a) authority
is suggested as a vehicle for the elimination of these weak-
nesses. This alternative is that the SBA no longer act in
a prime contractor role with other government agencies, but
instead act purely in an advisory role to the contractor.
The minority contractor would obtain contract: through the
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formal advertising process vice a negotiation process. The
contractor would be assisted by SBA personnel in the bid
preparation and provide training in the procedures of formal
advertising. The resultant contract under this alternative
would be between the procuring agency and the minority firm.
The subcontract between the SBA and the minority contractor,
and the prime contract between the SBA and the procuring
agency would be eliminated. The focus of the SBA's efforts
would go towards finding contracts to bid on, providing leans
and lines of credit to the firm, and a general education as
required in business and government procedures, especially
contract administration. Other SBA programs would be utilized,
where applicable, in providing this assistance and training.
This alternative eliminates the conflict thrust upon the
procuring agency regarding the use of a negotiated process,
since the procuring agency would utilize the formal advertising
process and all contractors, both majority and minority, would
be able to bid for the contract. In addition, the minority
contractor gains the added benefit of acquiring experience in
the actual process which will be utilized after disassociation
from the SBA should the contractor choose to do business with
the government. The minority firm should also be encouraged
to do business in the civilian sector c
Because the contractor can bid on any contract he desires,
the SBA would no longer be hampered by a lack of control over
procurement requirements. The SBA would, however, closely
advise the contractor on which procurements would be suitable
for his accomplishment. Program effectiveness would be
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measured by the number of contractors graduating from the
program and remaining viable, so the SBA would have an in-
centive to properly assist the contractors to insure that
they win seme awards and properly perform the job.
This alternative procedure of utilizing the formal adver-
tising process is not, however, without problems. The SBA
will still have to perform its mission with limited resources
and a third inherent weakness which creates conflict will
still be present. This inherent weakness, as discussed
earlier in the paper, is the conflict which results from
the SBA trying to meet the needs of small businessmen pre-
sently in existence while simultaneously trying to aid
minorities. These existing small businessmen, who are mostly
social majority firms, will still view the program of aiding
minority small businessmen as a threat to their existence.
Since the SBA is tasked with helping both existing and
minority small businessmen, situations may arise where the
SBA official may feel his actions to help only minority firms
are at the expense of assisting all firms. The authors feel
this conflict can be mitigated by keeping separate in the
SBA organization, those personnel engaged in aiding socially
or economically disadvantaged firms. The authors also believe
this alternative program should be retained with the SBA due
to their knowledge in the area of small business.
It is therefore recommended that this alternative pro-
cedure replace the £(a) program. If, however, the B(a) pro-
gram is to continue, the recommendations noted in this thesis
must be implemented to correct the deficiencies in the present
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program in order to maximize its effectiveness as a vehicle
for promoting viable minority firms. A summary of these de-
ficiencies and corresponding recommended corrective actions
follows.
Deficiency: Due to limited resources, i*e,, the size and
capacity of the SBA staff, the SBA adopted a policy of allowing
only a specified number of contractors in the program,. The
SBA chose to retain only those contractors who show the greatest
potential for becoming viable minority firms and concentrate
their limited resources on these firms. Such a policy may
eliminate some of the very firms who need help the most
Recommendation: That the SBA transfer 8(a) contractors
to other SBA programs when they have developed to the point
where these other programs can provide adequate support, thus
permitting more lesser developed contractors to enter the
program.
Deficiency: The SBA proposed to limit the number of firms
in the program to 1260 • Under this proposal, new firms will
be able to enter the program only when firms presently in the
program can be graduated or terminated. As it appears un-
likely that the rate of contractor exits will be large enough
to allow entry of all minority firms desirous of 8(a) assistance
the SBA^s policy of limiting the number of contractors in the
program has created the problem of deciding which contractors
should be allowed in the program.
Recommendation: That the SBA direct 8(a) program applicants
whose needs can be met by other SBA programs to those programs
and screen the remaining applicants to determine those that
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meet the criteria for program entry. Firms who qualify for
program entry and are in need of training and educational
assistance would be scheduled for such assistance on a first
come, first served basis. To promote a small and accurate
schedule, firms scheduled for assistance in the distant future
would be required to periodically reconfirm their desire to
participate in the program. Firms, which either don't need
or have completed training, would go on a waiting list of
firms that are ready to participate in an actual contract.
As openings in the program become available in the firm's area
of expertise, the firm would be admitted to the program.
Deficiency: Although the SBA's policy was to reduce the
number of contractors in the 8(a) program to a level which
its staff could adequately support, the number of contractors
that the SBA proposed to retain had contract, support require-
ments which exceeded the $(a) contract support requested by
the SBA from other government agencies o Consequently, con-
tractors in the $(a) program have been chronically underfunded
because the SBA has established its goals for agency contract
support independent of the contractor's needs.
Recommendation: That the SBA use the projected needs of
the contractors to be in the program for the forthcoming year
to generate the support levels to be requested from the pro-
curing agencies o If the requested support cannot be provided
by other agencies, the number of contractors in the program
should be reduced to match that support which can be provided.
While it is realized that such a contractor reduction may
further eliminate contractors most in need of assistance, it
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is considered to be the'most workable solution to the problem
of limited resources. Therefore, the number of contractors
in the program should be based on both the SBA's staffing level
and the contracts which the procuring agencies can provide
the SBA.
Deficiency: Because of its limited resources, the SBA
presently authorizes a sponsorship program whereby established
firms assist 8(a) firms in managing their business operation
and provide them with capital and training. There have been
many abuses in this program whereby an established firm set
up a new 8(a) firm for purposes of gaining contracts and
profits for which they would otherwise be ineligible. Owner-
ship and control was in actuality retained by the non-disad-
vantaged firm.
Recommendation: That the SBA abolish the sponsorship
program. If, however, the SBA chooses to continue this program,
then it is recommended that the SBA more closely monitor the
program and establish a contingent fee concept, whereby the
sponsor receives a consulting fee only when the 8(a) contractor
becomes viable
Deficiency: It it is determined during negotiation that
an amount over and above the government estimate is necessary
to meet a firm's needs and promote the contractor's growth,
the SBA may fund this differential in the form of a Business
Development Expense (BDE), This BDE takes the form of a
direct subsidy for a contract and thus provides little in-
centive for the contractor to prepare a meaningful cost
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proposal since he knows the difference between his proposal
and the government estimate may be funded by BDE.
Recommendation: That the SBA discontinue its present
policy of utilizing BDE as a direct grant on individual con-
tracts, and instead institute a loan program using BDE funds
either directly for contractor loans or as a guarantee for
commercial lenders.
Deficiency: For a procurement requirement, SBA negotiators
are presently provided by the procuring agency with a set of
plans and specifications, plus the government cost estimate.
The SBA negotiator uses this estimate as a basis for negotia-
tion with both the subcontractor and the procuring agency.
As the SBA negotiator has a primary responsibility to promote
the viability of the subcontractor, it seems unlikely that
he will also be able to protect the interests of the pro-
curing office.
Recommendation: That the SBA be given only the plans and
specifications, and not the government estimate. Subsequently
>
the SBA would assist the subcontractor in preparing his pro-
posal based only on the plans and specifications, and nego-
tiations will take place with SBA, subcontractor, and procuring
agency personnel all present. The primary focus of the nego-
tiation will be between the procuring agency and the subcon-
tractor, but the SBA may assist where necessary. The price
agreed upon by the personnel present at the negotiation would
be the price of the subcontract between the SBA and the B(a)
contractor. This price would also be the amount reflected
in the contract between the SBA and the procuring agency.
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If the contractor's proposal varies significantly from the
government estimate, the government estimate should be veri-
fied and the contractor made aware that his proposal appears
questionable and in what area it appears so.
Deficiency: In the past, there were no guidelines for
establishing criteria as to when a contractor was to be
terminated or was ready to "graduate" or complete the program.
The new SOP issued by the SBA now contains such guidelines but
they are not specific in that they have not been quantified.
Recommendation: That specific graduation criteria be
established and documented by the local SBA officer for each
£(a) contractor as he enters the program.
Deficiency: Construction and maintenance contracts must
normally be performed by local contractors. Therefore, to
consumate an S(a) award for a construction or maintenance
contract requires that the contractor be matched with a job
he can perform in his local area. The Navy's 8(a) support
goals are presently established at the headquarters level
and eventually distributed through the chain of command to
various local procuring offices. To match the type of work
with a corresponding construction contractor in a local area
is extremely difficult when done from the headquarters level
Recommendation: That the SBA and procuring agencies imple-
ment a "Local Task Force Concept" for establishing support
goals in the area of construction and maintenance. These
goals will then start at the bottom of the command chain
where local requirements can be matched with local 8(a)
contractor needs and work their way to the top for final
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approval. At the top, local goals will be examined to insure
that they are in consonance with long-range and overall pro-
gram objectives. Approved goals will then be promulgated to
local activities for implementation.
Deficiency: NAVFAC is responsible for meeting the Navy's
$(a) support goals in the area of shore facilities construction
and maintenance. Since NAVFAC only has direct control over
less than one-half of the total dollar volume of funds avail-
able for construction and maintenance work, NAVFAC does not
have authority commensurate with its responsibility. The
remaining funds are under the control of other Navy activities
and commands, yet no responsibility has been placed on them
for supporting the program.
Recommendation: That the ASN(I&L) issue official directives
to these other commands and activities informing them of the
purpose of the £(a) program and outlining the need for their
support for the program. Due to its primary mission, the
Navy's command and resource management system is not designed
to support the £(a) program and therefore is not structured
to provide NAVFAC the needed authority. The authors therefore
believe this recommendation to be the only feasible solution
to this deficiency.
In addition to these recommendations, other related
recommendations were made, A brief summary of these related
recommendations and the page on which they can be found follows.
That if the SBA is to require control by disadvantaged
persons, it should provide more definitive guidelines as to
the meaning of control. Page 48

That the SBA make rts procedures for selecting a contractor
to perform a specific contract, more formal. Pages 81-82.
That the ASPR be modified to provide the EFD's and pertinent
other procurement offices authority to award contracts to the
SBA and approve the results of the negotiations* Page 91
•
That responsibility for the 8(a) program at the local
procurement office level be placed with the Small Business
Specialist attached to the procuring office, in order to
separate as much as possible the responsibility for meeting
the procurement requirements of the agency from the responsi-
bility for ensuring that the 8(a) program is supported.
Page 112.
Although the authors were able to identify the afore-
mentioned deficiencies concerning program efficiency, the
effectiveness of the program could not be evaluated due to
its newness and a lack of appropriate data. Although only
31 firms had graduated from the program from 1968 to August
1974 [Kef. 6, p. i], it was felt that the length of time to
produce a viable company precluded any firm conclusions as
to 'effectiveness at the time of this writing. The lack of
meaningful data was the result of the absence of procedures
by the SBA to obtain data measuring the viability of con-
tractors after they completed the program—the only true in-
dicator of the success of the program,, It was therefore
recommended that the SBA develop a procedure for monitoring
contractors after they complete the 8(a) program, and develop




Efforts to determine the cause of variation in the past
performance of the Navy and NAVFAC in providing support for
the 3(a) program were similarly unsuccessful. The data avail-
able were found to be incomparable, as they were influenced
by variables which the authors were unable to quantify,, A
recommendation was made that the "Local Task Force Concept"
be used to establish realistic goals upon which an agency's
performance can be evaluated.
In conclusion, the authors concur in the basic goal of
the 8(a) program, which is to assist minorities. The authors
believe the alternative system presented at the beginning of
this chapter is a better method of providing assistance to
minority contractors o If, however, the decision is made to
retain the 8(a) program, the recommendations presented in
this thesis should be implemented to maximize the program
effectiveness as a tool for aiding minority firms.




SECTION 8(a) OF THE 19 5^
AMENDMENT TO THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT
Sec# 8(a) It shall be the duty of the Administration
and it is hereby empowered, whenever it determines such
action is necessary -
(1) To enter into contracts with the United States
Government and any department, agency, or officer thereof
having procurement powers obligating the Administration to
furnish articles, equipment, supplies, or materials to the
Government, In any case in which the Administration certi-
fies to any officer of the Government having procurement
powers that the Administration is competent to perform any
specific Government procurement contract to be let by any
such officer, such officer shall be authorized in his
discretion to let such procurement contract to the Adminis-
tration upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon
between the Administration and the procurement officer; and
(2) To arrange for the performance of such contracts by
negotiating or otherwise letting subcontracts to small business
concerns or others for the manufacture, supply, or assembly
of such articles, equipment, supplies, or materials, or parts
thereof, or servicing or processing in connection therewith,
or such management services as may be necessary to enable the
Administration to perform such contracts.
**********





Mr, Bernard Barston, Small Business/Economic Utilization
Advisor, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Washington, D. Co
Mr. Richard Beans, Small Business Administration,
Washington, D. C.
Mr. Ernest L. Bernhardt, Small Business Specialist, Chesa-
peake Division, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Eugene J. Birsinger, Business Development Specialist,
San Francisco District, Region IX, Small
Business Administration.
Mr. D. C. Buell, Assistant Regional Director for Procure-
ment Assistance, Region I, Boston, Small
Business Administration.
Mr. Frank Chieffalo, Small Business Specialist, Northern
Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Philadelphia, Pa.
Mr. James C. Cravens, Special Assistant to the Officer in
Charge/Small Business Specialist, Naval Regional
Procurement Office, Long Beach, Ca.
LCDR James Doebler, CEC, USN, Resident Officer in Charge
of Construction, Sewells Point Area, Norfolk, Va c
Mr. Stanley Franklin, Head, Stateside Branch, Construction
Division, Atlantic Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, Norfolk, Va.
Mr. Stephan Lo Keleti, Assistant Director, General Government
Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Joseph Kernan, Chief, Program Support Division, Office
of Business Development, Small Business Administra-
tion, Washington, Do Co
Mr. John Landicho, Associate Director, General Government
Division, General Accounting Office, Washington,
Do C.
Mr. Willie Leftwich, Hudson, Leftwich & Daver.port - Attorneys
at Law, Washington, D. C.
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Mr. Joseph A. Monteleone, Chief, Office of Business Develop-
ment, Region III, Philadelphia, Small Business
Administration.
Mr. Thomas Page, Director, Contracts Division, Southern
Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Charleston, S. C*
Mr. Julio Perez, Program Control Analyst, Office of Business
Development, Small Business Administration,
Washington, D. C.
Mr. S. A« Perez, Program Coordinator, Western Division,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, San Bruno,
Ca.
Honorable Morris Questal, Special Assistant for Small Business
and Economic Utilization, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Installation and Logistics).
Mr. R Robertory, Head, Contracts Procedures Branch, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Richard Sadowski, Director. Reports Management Division,
.Small Business Administration, Washington, D. C.
Mr. George W. Schlink, Contract Negotiator, San Francisco
District, Small Business Administration*
Mr. John Shepard, Assistant to the Director, Small Business
and Economic Utilization Policy, Department of
Defense, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Ronald Skaggs, Small Business Specialist, Southern
Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Charleston, S. C.
LT Robert Taylor, Acquisition Coordination Officer, Western
Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, San
Bruno, Ca.
Dr. Joseph Zimecki, Contracting Officer, Office of Business





THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
The Small Business Administration ( SBA ) is an agency of
the federal government established to aid the small business
sector of the U. S. economy. Headquartered in Washington,
D. C. and headed up by a civilian administrator, the SBA's
responsibilities include:
1. Aiding, counseling, assisting, and protecting the
interests of small business.
2. Insuring that small business concerns receive a
fair proportion of government purchases, contracts, and
subcontracts.
3» Making loans to small business concerns
4» Improving the management skills of small business
owners, potential owners, and managers©
5. Conducting studies of the economic environment
At the present time, the SBA administers some 17 programs,
of which the £(a) program is one. To accomplish its mission,
the SBA operates 10 regional offices and $1 branch and district
offices. The geographical distribution of the SBA regional
offices is depicted on the accompanying map.
The responsibility for the conduct of the 3(a) program
falls under the jurisdiction of the Office of Business Develop-
ment within the SBA organization. This office's director
reports directly to the Associate Administrator for Procurement
Assistance, who in turn, reports directly to the Administrator






THE NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command is one of six
subordinate systems commands under the Chief of Naval Material,
Located in Washington, D. C, it is commanded by a rear
admiral commissioned in the Civil Engineer Corps of the U. S.
Navy. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) is
responsible for:





5. Real Property Inventory management*
6. Transportation management.
7. Natural resources and pollution control programs.
8. Providing engineering and technical services related
to nuclear shore power.
To accomplish its mission, NAVFAC delegates authority to
six Engineering Field Divisions (EFD) These EFD's are
located in Washington, D. C, Norfolk, Va«, Charleston, S. C,
Philadelphia, Pa., San Bruno, Ca., and Honolulu, Hi. Each
of these EFD's exercise their authority throughout the geo-
graphical region they are assigned. The respective regions
are depicted on the accompanying map. The responsibilities
of the EFD's are:
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1, Planning, design, and construction of public works,
public utilities, and special facilities of the Navy
and other federal agencies, as assigned,
2, Acquiring and disposal of real estate for the Navy,
3, To advise and assist in the administration of facili-
ties management resources
A-, To direct and administer the assignment, replacement,
disposal, maintenance, and utilization of transportation,
weight-handling, and construction equipment under the
cognizance of NAVFAC
.
5, To assist activities in the application of programs
that are assigned to NAVFAC for technical or management
direction,
6, Other duties as may be directed by NAVFAC.
NAVFAC is the only agency authorized to award contracts
for construction and maintenance of the Navy's shore estab-
lishment o This authority is delegated by the Commander,
NAVFAC to the various EFD's, and in turn, delegated by the
EFD's to various field representatives o These representatives
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COMPARISON OF EFD AND ACTIVITY SET ASIDES
ENGINEERING FISCAL YEAR
FIELD
DIVISIONS 71 72 73 74
No. $ Noo $ No. $ No. $
Northern EFD 154 14.1 200 15.8 167 11.1 174 13.1
Division
Activity 607 11.1 645 16.4 600 14.5 543 15.7
Atlantic EFD 118 10.9 102 8.9 100 13.1 106 13.1
Division
Activity 458 10.4 615 17.7 506 14.9 451 13.5
Southern EFD 204 l8<>9 259 20.9 226 17.4 231 17.0
Division
Activity 810 13.0 599 11.3 508 13c4 533 19o5
Western EFD 184 16.1 195 24.7 176 20.7 162 19.8
Division
Activity 699 16.1 668 17.9 713 22.4 771 23.5
Chesapeake EFD 83 7.5 104 10 o 9 133 12.6 153 15.1
Division
Activity 323 6.5 423 9.8 403 12.8 337 9.0
Note: $ in millions. Totals reflect all contract awards for
$500,000 and less.
Source: Data compiled by the authors from Contract Summary
Report s( NAVDOCK 1883) prepared by the Engineering Field
Divisions of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command.
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ASBCA Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
ASPR Armed Services Procurement Regulations
ASN(I&L) Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations
and Logistics
BDE Business Development Expense
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CONUS Continental United States
DOD Department of Defense
EFD Engineering Field Division
EO Executive Order
GAO General Accounting Office
MCON Military Construction (refers to Appropriations)
NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command
0ASN(I&L) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Installations and Logistics
PL Public Lav/
SBA Small Business Administration
SDPA Small Defense Plants Administration




1. Armed Services Procurement Regulations, April 16, 1973,
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3» Carter, John So H», Succ ess and its D eterminants: A Study
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Instruction 43&0.2 (Rough Draft), Contracting with
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III, 5 ovember I97TT
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,
June "25 , l9T4«~
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1942.
9« Congress. Senate, Defense Production Act of 1950 « Pub,
Law 774, Slst Cong., 2ncrsesSo,~"3.R«> 9176, Sept. 8,
1950.
10, Congress. Senate. Amendment_to R e c on st ru ct i on Finance
Corporation Acto Pu5T Lav; 13^, S.T. ResT~T35, "June
wf^wr.——
11, Congress. Senate. Defense Production Act Amendments of
1953. Pub. Law 95, June7K57"T7?53 •
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12. Congress, Senate. ' Reconstruction Finance Corporation
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TKi t,,Tv 'M. '\Tstrr "163, July 30, 1^377
13 • CongresSo Senate. Amendment to the Defense Production
Act of 1950 . Pub. Law ^6, July 31, 1951.
14. Congress. Senate. Amendment to the Economic Opportunity
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15. Congress. Senate. Small Business Amendment of 1974 .
Pub. Law 93-3367~93rd Cong., 1st Sess., S. Res. 3331,
Dec. 3, 1974.
16. Cravens, James E. , Minority Business Program Contracting
with SBA under Section o(a)
,
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Conference on Minority' Business Opportunity, Oxnard,
Calif. 2 Aug. 1974o
17. Federal Reporter, 477, 2nd series* Ray Baillie Trash
Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe , 1973,~"o97^T0T~~
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vo Kleppe o 1971, 194-203. '
19. Hudson, Leftwich & Davenport—Attorneys at Law. Un^ub—
lished Study on the 8(a) Program •
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ments for Developing and Coordinating a National
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Federal Regulations, Title 3, Mar. 5, 1969, Po 779-
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33. President. Executive Order 11625. "Prescribing Addi-
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a National Program for Minority Business Enterprise."
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 3, Oct. 13, 1971,
p. 213-217.
34. President Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, et. al.
dated December 11, 1975.
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VJashington, D. Co, GPO, November 14, 1974.
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